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THE ATHEIST DELUSION

11/4/2016

I'm not sure how I got on their mailing list, but not long ago I received an email from Ray Comfort's people announcing his new film, The Atheist Delusion. It promised to destroy atheism with one simple question. I suspected bananas might be involved...

Apparently Ray is no longer depending on the banana to make his case, however – which was certainly something of a disappointment. Nevertheless, the argument remains essentially the same. His one question that “destroys atheism” is (are you ready?): Could a book come into being by accident, without having been put together by some intelligence? And if not, then how could DNA – the “book of life” – have come into being without an intelligent designer?

The funny thing is that Ray seems convinced that atheists have never heard of this “problem” before. It's as if he expects us to be taken by surprise, and maybe even to immediately drop to our knees and ask Jesus for forgiveness. True, some of the unsuspecting random individuals he interviews seem unsure how to answer him. But does Ray really think that people like Lawrence Krauss (who is briefly featured in the movie) have never come across this old and tired argument? Or that they don't know what to say in reply?

I only watched the first 20 minutes or so – already way too much. I had to stop soon after Ray asked one of his interviewees, How did chickens see before they evolved eyes? And how did they search for food before they evolved a brain, or breathe before they evolved lungs? Moreover, he adds, this isn't just a problem with chickens: One has to explain the same thing with respect to “elephants, horses, cats, cows, human beings,” and so on. Yes, in Ray's fantasy version of evolution, each species had to evolve every one of its organs from scratch!

Maybe from now on he should just stick with bananas?

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THE PARADOXES OF DENYING INFINITY

9/23/2016

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As I mentioned last time, no claim I've made has been criticized by the religious more than the claim that there are actual infinities. And yet there appear to be clear cases of infinity all around us. For example, every line segment contains an infinite number of subintervals, as can be seen from (among other things) the fact that in going from its beginning to its end one first goes half of the way, then 3/4 of the way, 7/8, 15/16, and so on ad infinitum.

Using this as an example of an actual infinity raises the question of Zeno's paradox, however, and some of the aforementioned critics have done just that. According to Zeno, since this series of intervals never ends – since there are an actual infinite number of them between any two points A and B – one can never go from A to B.

Now, other than agreeing with Zeno that all motion is an illusion, we have two main alternatives here. The first is to agree that there are an infinite number of intervals but to claim that we can in fact move across all of them. The other is to deny that there are an infinite number of intervals.

It is often said that an infinite series is one that by definition cannot be completed, since after all it has no end. But that isn't the case. Consider the principal claim that the religious finitists (i.e., infinity deniers) insist on making, namely that the past cannot be infinite. They do so by arguing that an infinite series of events could not have already taken place, as that would mean it has been completed. But why can't an infinite series of past events occur given an infinite amount of time?

We can resolve Zeno's paradox, it seems to me, once we see how the infinite series that it involves is also one that can be completed. However, the solution is a bit complicated, so I'll leave it to the end of this post. First, I want to consider the other alternative, that of the finitists.

There is more than one way to be a finitist about the number of intervals in a line segment, but the one that appears to be favored by those who have corresponded with me is to argue that the number of subdivisions involved is potentially, rather than actually, infinite. That is, these individuals claim that there are an infinite number of possible subdivisions in the sense that one could in principle keep dividing a line segment forever, but that, since one could never finish the task, there never could be an actual infinite number of intervals there.

The problem with this is that it treats the intervals as something that is created by our actually dividing the line (at least mentally). That is, it assumes that when one is talking about each part of the line in question (its first half, the 1/4 that follows that, and so on), one is talking about parts that we have already marked off from the rest. But that is not what Zeno's paradox is about. The first half, the one fourth that follows that, and all the other intervals that Zeno is referring to are geometrical parts that are present in the line whether anyone takes notice of them or not. In other words, they are already there. It's true that we could never mark off all of them, as it would take forever, but that's irrelevant.

A second way of arguing that a line does not contain an infinite number of intervals is to claim that the line is not infinitely divisible, not even potentially – that is, to claim that there are smallest parts that cannot be divided further even in principle. But that too is highly problematic. For then what one is claiming is that there are segments of a line that are not zero sized and yet that have no further parts. But if one of these spatial "atoms" isn't zero sized, that's because there is some distance between one end of it and the other – which in turn means the two ends must be distinct. And that contradicts the claim that it has no parts.

Finitists object to infinity by claiming that it leads to paradoxes. And yet what these examples show is that the rejection of infinity introduces paradoxes as well. One individual I debated online on this topic – a defender of the above potential infinity view – actually maintained that the two halves of a line do not exist until someone divides the line in half. Now, I admit that there are unsolved paradoxes of infinity. Philosophers and mathematicians haven't yet worked out all of the issues on the subject. But I find the existence of infinity paradoxes more acceptable precisely because they involve infinity – a concept that our minds have a hard time grasping. It's very easy for or intuitions to go wrong whenever the infinite is involved. I'm not willing to accept, however, that my intuition that the two halves of a line exist prior to our dividing the line could be wrong!

THE SOLUTION TO ZENO'S PARADOX

It is often claimed that Zeno's paradox is dissolved once we realize that the sum of the infinite series 1/2 + 1/4 + 1/8 + …. is 1. But that would be the solution only if Zeno's claim were that the distance from A to B must be infinite – and that doesn't seem to be what Zeno was claiming. Moreover, even if he was claiming that, it doesn't matter, since we can see a different problem – namely, that in order to reach B (never mind that it is clearly only a finite distance away), one must complete an infinite series. That is what appears impossible.

But it isn't. Above, I claimed that at least some infinite series can in fact be completed. For instance, given an infinite amount of time, an infinite number of events can occur. (My favorite example here is one that is credited to Wittgenstein: imagine coming across someone who says “...4, 3, 2, 1, 0. Finished!” and then explains he has been counting backwards from eternity.)

So some infinite series can be completed given infinite time in which to do so. But it doesn't necessarily take an infinite amount of time. Aristotle pointed out that, obviously, the time it takes to move from A to B can also be divided into its first half, its next fourth, and so on. Thus, there are an infinite number of subintervals of time in which to cover the infinite number of subintervals of length between A and B. The situation is therefore analogous to the one in which an infinite number of events occur in an infinite amount of time: in both cases, there is a time available for each event in question to take place.

Now, this at first may not seem sufficient to solve the paradox. We can imagine Zeno objecting that, just as there is a problem with completing the infinite series of intervals between A and B, there is a problem (given that the span involved contains an infinite number of temporal intervals) with the passage of time from moment T1 to moment T2. I myself made this objection in the past – as did Wesley Salmon (Space, Time & Motion, p. 36). However – and regardless of whether this is exactly what he had in mind – Aristotle's simple observation contains within it the solution to the problem.

We can see this by first keeping in mind that the infinite number of subdivisions (whether of temporal or spatial intervals) adds up to the span in question. That is (to consider the spatial case first), we already know that it is the distance between A and B that contains the infinite number of intervals we're discussing. So there is no question about there being a point B, only one about how one can arrive at it. Similarly, we know that it is the span T1 to T2 that has an infinite number of temporal intervals. So once again, there is no question about the existence of T2, only about how it ever can arrive. But now one can see that the above objection really makes no sense. Because for there to be a time T2 (that is not infinitely in the future) is the same thing as for it to eventually arrive! It is incoherent to claim that there is such a time and to also claim that it can never arrive. (Similarly, it would be incoherent to claim that there is a point B and to also claim that it is nowhere.) Therefore, Zeno cannot reasonably object that it is impossible for the time between T1 and T2 to transpire. It would be akin to the claim that the distance between A and B does not exist.

(I am not, incidentally, claiming that Zeno wouldn't say that. In fact, as a disciple of Parmenides, he would say precisely this about the distance – and might, faced with the above considerations, say the analogous thing regarding the time span. But none of this is relevant to the paradoxes, which take as their starting point the fact that there are distances and durations before attempting to show that such an assumption creates a problem.)

Given that T2 will eventually be here, it follows that there is in fact a temporal interval available for moving across each interval between A and B (all the way to and including B). The fact that both the number of line segments and the number of temporal intervals is infinite is no more problematic than the fact that in a universe without a beginning, the number of past events and the number of past moments are both infinite. In both situations, the availability of a time for each event to occur in is all that is needed to avoid paradox.

One final note: Above, I stated that one could never finish the task of dividing the distance between A and B into an infinite number of intervals. However, in principle, someone could in fact do so – just as we can, and do, go through all of these intervals in moving from A to B. The someone in question would simply need to perform the task at an ever increasing rate, e.g., by making the first division in 30 seconds, the second in 15, the third in 7.5, and so on, so as to complete the task in one minute flat. As Bertrand Russell once said, the impossibility of performing an infinite number of tasks in a finite amount of time is merely “medical.”

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ACTUAL INFINITY AND THE INFINITE FUTURE

8/31/2016

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No claim I've made has been criticized by the religious more than the claim that there are actual infinities. On the face of it, this is odd, given that God is supposedly infinite. But what motivates these critics is their belief that if no actual infinities exist, then the past cannot be infinite, and thus the universe had a beginning – which of course allows them to then more easily argue for the necessity of a creator.

These same people admit the infinity of the future, however – it's just that they don't see it as problematic. They believe that it doesn't represent an actual infinity, but only a potential one.

To understand this distinction, think of the process of counting. This process is potentially infinite – meaning it can in principle go on forever. However, no matter how long one counts, one will never actually reach infinity. Similarly, the future, it is said, is only potentially infinite: there will always be more tomorrows, but for all that the totality will always remain finite (reality never arrives at infinity), and so there never will be an actually infinite future.

An infinite past, on the other hand, is seen as problematic, because all of its yesterdays have already occurred – which means there have already been an actually infinite number of them.

This difference between the past and the future is highly intuitive – though interestingly, Aristotle, who rejected actual infinities and who came up with the actual/potential distinction, disagreed with it. Mathematician James A. Lindsay is another infinity denier who disagrees (see his book Dot, Dot, Dot, pp. 52-53).

It's also true that the above difference cannot be maintained if one thinks of all of temporal reality as equally real, so that the future is every bit as much “there” as the present and past; the difference only works on the common sense view that time involves an actual coming into being of moments. But let's accept this common sense view (as maybe we should), and also leave aside the views of Aristotle and Lindsay (both of which I think can reasonably be denied). Let's grant, in other words, the difference between the past and the future in the above argument. Even in that case, I maintain, the infinite future presents us with an actual infinity, and therefore with a problem for infinity deniers.

Here's why. Although the future hasn't happened yet, it remains the case that there is a matter of fact regarding each and every single future event. Consider: if I say that tomorrow, x will happen, then my statement is either true or false. After all, either x will happen tomorrow or it will not. Even if the future is not predetermined, so that it has not yet been “decided” whether x will happen or not, it remains the case that it will either happen or not happen. Thus, my statement is either true or false. Moreover, if, as it turns out, x does happen, then my statement is true. (After all, in that case it certainly isn't false.) And the same thing applies to every tomorrow: no matter what future time you care to consider, there is a matter of fact regarding what will happen at that time.

But this means that if the future is infinite, then there is an actual infinity of facts regarding what will happen. And what's worse – at least in that it makes the point more palpable – is that if you believe God knows all the facts about the future, then you must believe he knows an actual infinity of facts. (For more on the future and God's supposed knowledge of it, see my paper Is God's Foreknowledge Compatible with Free Will?, especially the addendum.)

This actual infinity of facts should be every bit as problematic as any other for infinity deniers. I conclude that infinity deniers who make the above argument are actually wrong.

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A MISTAKE SOME ATHEISTS MAKE

7/14/2016

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Atheists often maintain that it is their opponents who have the burden of proof: they are the ones making a claim – that there is a God – and so it is up to them to provide the reasons or evidence in support of that claim.

Now, in a sense, this is entirely correct. Theists do have a burden of proof. And if all that these atheists are saying is that they lack belief because they have not yet seen any good evidence, then it is in fact their opponents' job to make their case.

However, many atheists who make the above claim also often say that God doesn't exist. But to say that God doesn't exist is also to make a claim, and thus to incur a burden of proof. And yet, when challenged to justify their positive disbelief, some of these atheists revert to the “atheism is merely a lack of belief” line, and deny that they have to justify anything.

The mistake here is obvious – almost too simple to seem worth pointing out – yet is one I've seen several times online. And it just opens the door to criticism of atheists.

Perhaps there is some confusion in all this as a result of the oft-repeated claim that “one cannot prove a negative”. If one cannot prove a negative, and the statement “God does not exist” is a negative, then one cannot prove “God does not exist” – and doesn't it then follow that one cannot have a burden to prove such a thing? I've seen at least one YouTuber apparently arguing along such lines.

But, to begin with, a burden of proof – in spite of its name – is only a burden to provide justification for a claim, and not strictly speaking to prove it. (When someone makes a claim, they should be ready to provide a reason for accepting it as true. As a general rule, however, it is too much to demand that they be able to prove the claim is true.) Furthermore, it simply isn't the case that one cannot prove a negative, so this entire argument rests on a confusion anyway.

My suggestion is that nonbelievers need to make a clear choice between so-called positive and negative atheism. Positive atheists are those who make the claim that God does not exist, whereas negative atheists merely lack belief in God. Positive atheism, in other words, is “traditional” atheism – the belief that there is no God; negative atheism covers all other nontheists.

If one is merely a negative atheist, then one can place the burden of proof on one's opponents. As soon as one makes a claim that there is no God, however, then one has incurred a burden of proof.

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ATHEISM: Q & A

5/20/2016

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I've published a new book, Atheism: Q & A. Its main purpose is to answer common misunderstandings about atheism, such as the notion that atheists have no reason to be moral or that we must lead empty, meaningless lives. An added section consists of selected posts from this blog (with a few modifications) that explain some common atheist positions and answer further criticisms.

Although there is some unavoidable overlap with my first book, this one is much shorter and simpler, as it's intended for a wider audience. I think it will be useful for any atheists who are interested in replies to common criticisms, and a good book to share with theists.

The cover was designed by my 12-year-old son, Eric.

See it on Amazon: Paperback Kindle

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DOES ATHEISM TAKE THE MEANING OUT OF LIFE?

4/30/2016

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Theists often argue that without God, life would be meaningless. There are a couple of reasons for this. The first is that they suppose that only an eternal life can have any value. As William Lane Craig says in his popular book Reasonable Faith, “If each individual person passes out of existence when he dies, then what ultimate meaning can be given to his life? Does it matter whether he ever existed at all?” Craig also claims that “If God does not exist, then both man and the universe are inevitably doomed to death.”

But though eternal life is regarded as necessary to give it meaning, it isn't sufficient: an eternity in Hell, after all, isn't a worthwhile existence. Or, as another Christian philosopher, J. P. Moreland, puts it in Scaling the Secular City, “Bestowing eternity on an empty life does not make it meaningful. It may yield only an eternity of emptiness.” According to these theists, then, in addition to everlasting life, there must be a God in order for life to have value. As Craig says, “if man and the universe could exist forever, but if there were no God, their existence would still have no ultimate significance.”

There are quite a few problems with all of these claims. For instance, why is the universe “inevitably doomed to death” if there is no God? Maybe it is, maybe it isn't, but the nonexistence of God certainly doesn't guarantee such a thing. And humanity – or at least some intelligent life forms – may also, for all we know, persist indefinitely.

It is far more certain that individual lives come to an end, though again this doesn't follow from the mere fact of God's nonexistence. But does the fact that life ends – assuming it is a fact – make it pointless? Does it follow in that case that our existence here and now should be of no importance to us?

To answer this, suppose that you've just arrived in Heaven, and are told that you have all of eternity ahead of you to do as you like. Now, I'm not denying that that would be a good thing (though some atheists do deny that endless existence would be good). But if your heavenly existence is worthwhile, that can only be because the individual spans of time you spend there are themselves worthwhile. In other words, in order for your never-ending afterlife to be a good thing, the finite spans that it is made up of must be good, at least on the whole. Note that both Craig and Moreland admit as much. But now, if the finite spans are good – if they are something you value – then they are that in themselves, even if there isn't an unlimited number of them. In order for an experience to be valuable, it is not necessary for there to be an unlimited number of additional valuable experiences as well.

As to how God makes life meaningful, that isn't entirely clear. Moreland has more to say about this than Craig, yet the only thing he actually claims is that “the value and purpose of life... are grounded in God's nature” – whatever that means.

What theists seem to have in mind is that God had a reason for creating the world as he did, a plan for it and for us – and that this somehow gives meaning to our existence. But first, why is it the case that if God has some purpose in mind, that makes my life meaningful for me? After all, what if I don't care about his purpose? (For example, what if his purpose is to have his creatures end up in Heaven singing his praises for all eternity? Maybe I'd rather not do that – or rather, I definitely would rather not do that.) Second, and more important, even if God has some plan or purpose in mind, what makes that something of ultimate significance? Of course at this point the theist is just going to say that this is God we're talking about, after all, so his purposes are by definition ultimate. But why should anyone agree with such a definition? If my plans and purposes, according to theism, are of no significance in themselves, what makes God's any different? Is it just because he's really powerful? Why should that matter?

If Craig and Moreland's arguments about a lack of ultimate significance make any sense at all, then they make sense even if there is a God. God may desire this or that, but so what? Ultimately, what's the point even if God really desires it? Would it actually have made any difference if nothing, including God, had ever existed?

Quotes:
Reasonable Faith, pp. 71-73
Scaling the Secular City , p. 130

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GOD'S WONDERFUL PLAN

4/8/2016

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Christians are of course familiar with the idea that God sent Christ into the world in order to save those who happen to believe in him and who accept his offer of forgiveness. What they may not be entirely aware of, however, is how the need for salvation came about in the first place. Sure, everyone knows part of the story: Adam and Eve sinned, which somehow caused everyone else to do so, thus making Jesus necessary. But did God plan all of this in the first place?

Most Christians say he did not. They argue that sin is due to our own free will, and therefore that God did not intend it so much as allow it.

But that's wrong, and one does not need to appeal to abstract philosophical arguments (which never work on believers anyway) to come to this conclusion: The Bible itself says that God planned it this way. He wanted human beings to be sinners so that he could then forgive some of them.

In Romans 11:32, Paul informs us that “God has imprisoned all in disobedience so that he may be merciful to all.” This same essential message is repeated in Galatians 3:22, which states that “the scripture has imprisoned all things under the power of sin, so that what was promised through faith in Jesus Christ might be given to those who believe.” (NRSV, emphasis added.)

Paul is very clear about this: God made humans into sinners in order to then send Christ as a savior. Thus, it's not that God hates sin; it's that he wants us to need his forgiveness – for something he caused in the first place!

The only real mystery is why anyone considers that a good or just plan.

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ANOTHER REASON FOR DOUBTING MORAL OBJECTIVISM

3/30/2016

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Moral objectivism is the view that there are moral truths that apply to everyone, whether they agree with them or not – just as there are truths about physics or geology or mathematics.

One argument commonly used against moral objectivism is that people often disagree about ethical matters. By itself, however, this isn't a very strong argument. After all, there are disagreements in every area. For instance, some people believe the earth was created less than 10,000 years ago, others that it formed more than 4 billion years ago – but in spite of that, the age of our planet is a perfectly objective matter. Mere disagreement, then, does not mean anything.

But there is a different argument along the same lines that makes a much stronger case. At the very least, it shows that there is something odd about moral objectivism.

The argument begins with the observation that in other areas, there are facts that are obvious, and that as a result just about everyone agrees with. For instance, everyone agrees that fire is hot, or that 1+1=2. Where there are disagreements, it is because the matter is not regarded as something really obvious.

In ethics, however, that's not the case: there are many things that are regarded as obvious by many – even by most people – but which nevertheless are denied by large numbers of other people. For example, the principle that killing an innocent person is (almost always) wrong is one that, for those who agree with it, seems perfectly obvious – about as obvious as that fire is hot or that 1+1=2. And yet, plenty of people disagree with this principle.

Mere disagreement might not mean anything; but disagreement over what is supposedly obvious is much harder to explain. Why is it just about no one doubts simple truths in arithmetic or simple empirical truths, but so many doubt what – given that they are regarded as equally obvious – should be simple truths in ethics? Might it be because they are not actually truths?

(For more on objectivism and subjectivism in ethics – and why subjectivism is compatible with taking morality seriously – see chapter 5 of my book The Truth about God.)

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ERIC HOVIND ON WHAT IT MEANS TO BE A CHRISTIAN

3/10/2016

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Christian fundamentalist Eric Hovind is one of those people who love to present mistaken but confusing arguments to trip up his opponents. Consider the way he attempted to defeat ex-Christian Bernie Dehler during this debate by insisting that Dehler had never been a real Christian. Hovind maintained that to be a Christian is to have a personal relationship with Christ. He then asked Dehler if he ever had such a relationship – “Yes or no?” Of course Dehler, who doesn't believe there is a Christ, had to answer no. He at one time thought he had such a relationship, but obviously it wasn't real. Christ would have to exist before anyone could have a relationship with him.

According to Hovind, then, “to say I used to be a Christian assumes that God does exist”!

All of this is of course part of a strategy Hovind uses to make his opponent's case appear weaker. For if his opponent never was a Christian, then he can't claim to have an insider's understanding of Christianity. But it doesn't take much to realize just how ridiculous Hovind's argument is.

To begin with, when an atheist says “I used to be a Christian” – or when anyone not professing to be a Christian uses the term “Christian,” for that matter – what he means is not “someone who has a personal relationship with Christ,” but at most “someone who believes that they have a personal relationship with Christ.” Obviously, one cannot consistently mean the former and at the same time deny that Christ is real. So anyone who doesn't accept Christianity isn't going to accept Hovind's definition of it – not if they want to continue using the term meaningfully.

Suppose, though, that one does go along with Hovind's definition. Well, in that case, then, there are no Christians – not unless the people who call themselves Christian are actually right. All the atheist needs to say in this case is, “Okay, if you go by that definition, I was never a Christian – but only because there never has been a Christian, including you!”

There is another problem with Hovind's argument, though. Hovind claims that “if you say I thought I did [have a relationship with Christ], but I didn't, then… you never were a Christian.” But that doesn't follow. If you go by his definition and the Christians are right, then the atheist who says “I used to be a Christian” could be correct. For if Christ does exist and people have relationships with him, then it could be that the atheist was one such person. The fact that he now no longer believes that the relationship was real does not prove it wasn't.

Hovind, then, is once again wrong about everything.

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THE WILLIAM LANE CRAIG / KEVIN SCHARP DEBATE

2/25/2016

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Last night, I attended a debate between Christian philosopher William Lane Craig and Ohio State University philosopher Kevin Scharp on whether there is evidence for God. I had previously seen portions of several debates with Craig on YouTube, and in those he always appeared to do rather well. I was surprised, therefore, by how poorly he performed yesterday. Craig managed to misunderstand some pretty straightforward points made by Scharp and – what's worse – on at least two occasions, his misunderstandings appeared to be willful.

One of the things Scharp argued is that there is a difference between having a belief and merely having greater than 50% confidence that something is true. The example he used to illustrate this point made it very clear what he was talking about: although he thinks it's about 51% probable that Clinton will be our next president, it would be incorrect to describe that as having the belief that she is going to be the next president. Belief requires greater confidence than that.

Now, this point seems rather easy to understand, and yet Craig acted very confused about it – and not just once, but twice. In other words, even after Scharp explained what he meant, Craig still didn't seem to get it. This was bizarre. Nevertheless, it did appear that the confusion in this case was genuine. My guess is that Craig was having a hard time interpreting the point because he was trying to figure out how it applied to his claims and just couldn't make the connection. (I myself don't see that it necessarily does apply to his arguments – that is, I didn't understand Craig to be claiming merely that the existence of God is more likely than not.)

But as I've already said, in some cases Craig appeared to purposely misinterpret the point being made – and that's more troubling.

The clearest example of that occurred when Scharp claimed that the resurrection violates known laws of nature – and therefore that even outlandish explanations for what really happened that do not violate such laws are preferable. To make this point, he used the crazy example that perhaps aliens came down to earth after the crucifixion and stole Jesus's body. He actually used the word “crazy,” or something to that effect, in describing this example. But in spite of that, Craig immediately responded with something like “Is that really where you want to go? Is that what you are going to claim?”

It got a big laugh, as well as enthusiastic applause, from much of the audience. Many of those in attendance obviously thought Craig had just demonstrated how foolish atheists are – so foolish they think Jesus's body may actually have been stolen by aliens. But of course that's not what Scharp was claiming, and surely Craig knows that.

In an earlier post, I wrote of my suspicions that sometimes Craig is dishonest. I'm sorry to report that as of last night, those suspicions have been confirmed.

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THE ATHEIST DELUSION

THE PARADOXES OF DENYING INFINITY

ACTUAL INFINITY AND THE INFINITE FUTURE

A MISTAKE SOME ATHEISTS MAKE

ATHEISM: Q & A

DOES ATHEISM TAKE THE MEANING OUT OF LIFE?

GOD'S WONDERFUL PLAN

ANOTHER REASON FOR DOUBTING MORAL OBJECTIVISM

ERIC HOVIND ON WHAT IT MEANS TO BE A CHRISTIAN

THE WILLIAM LANE CRAIG / KEVIN SCHARP DEBATE

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