franz kiekeben
  • Home
  • Blog
  • Philosophy
  • Publications
  • Contact

ANOTHER REASON FOR DOUBTING MORAL OBJECTIVISM

3/30/2016

0 Comments

 

Moral objectivism is the view that there are moral truths that apply to everyone, whether they agree with them or not – just as there are truths about physics or geology or mathematics.

One argument commonly used against moral objectivism is that people often disagree about ethical matters. By itself, however, this isn't a very strong argument. After all, there are disagreements in every area. For instance, some people believe the earth was created less than 10,000 years ago, others that it formed more than 4 billion years ago – but in spite of that, the age of our planet is a perfectly objective matter. Mere disagreement, then, does not mean anything.

But there is a different argument along the same lines that makes a much stronger case. At the very least, it shows that there is something odd about moral objectivism.

The argument begins with the observation that in other areas, there are facts that are obvious, and that as a result just about everyone agrees with. For instance, everyone agrees that fire is hot, or that 1+1=2. Where there are disagreements, it is because the matter is not regarded as something really obvious.

In ethics, however, that's not the case: there are many things that are regarded as obvious by many – even by most people – but which nevertheless are denied by large numbers of other people. For example, the principle that killing an innocent person is (almost always) wrong is one that, for those who agree with it, seems perfectly obvious – about as obvious as that fire is hot or that 1+1=2. And yet, plenty of people disagree with this principle.

Mere disagreement might not mean anything; but disagreement over what is supposedly obvious is much harder to explain. Why is it just about no one doubts simple truths in arithmetic or simple empirical truths, but so many doubt what – given that they are regarded as equally obvious – should be simple truths in ethics? Might it be because they are not actually truths?

(For more on objectivism and subjectivism in ethics – and why subjectivism is compatible with taking morality seriously – see chapter 5 of my book The Truth about God.)
​
0 Comments



Leave a Reply.

    Archives

    April 2022
    May 2021
    April 2021
    March 2021
    October 2020
    September 2020
    August 2020
    May 2020
    April 2020
    March 2020
    February 2020
    January 2020
    December 2019
    November 2019
    October 2019
    September 2019
    August 2019
    July 2019
    May 2019
    April 2019
    March 2019
    January 2019
    December 2018
    November 2018
    October 2018
    September 2018
    August 2018
    July 2018
    June 2018
    May 2018
    April 2018
    March 2018
    February 2018
    January 2018
    December 2017
    November 2017
    October 2017
    September 2017
    August 2017
    July 2017
    June 2017
    May 2017
    March 2017
    February 2017
    January 2017
    December 2016
    November 2016
    September 2016
    August 2016
    July 2016
    May 2016
    April 2016
    March 2016
    February 2016
    January 2016
    December 2015
    November 2015
    October 2015
    September 2015
    August 2015
    July 2015
    May 2015
    April 2015
    March 2015
    February 2015
    January 2015
    December 2014
    November 2014
    October 2014
    September 2014
    August 2014
    July 2014
    June 2014

    Categories

    All
    Atheism
    Creationism
    Determinism And Free Will
    Ethics
    Infinity
    Politics And Religion
    Presuppositionalism

    RSS Feed

Link to my author's page on Amazon