franz kiekeben
  • Home
  • Blog
  • Philosophy
  • Publications
  • Contact

On Matt Slick's Transcendental Argument

3/29/2017

10 Comments

 
For quite some time now, Matt Slick, the president of the Christian Apologetics and Research Ministry (CARM), has been promoting a version of the transcendental argument for the existence of God. About a year ago, that argument was decisively refuted by Alex Malpass, a philosopher at Bristol University. In spite of this, Slick continues to maintain that it has not been refuted and that all Malpass showed is that the argument needs to be reworded. Last I heard, he is still working on an improved version.

In this post, I want to help make it clear exactly what Malpass's objections are, and more importantly, what Slick would have to do to avoid them. For understanding what Slick has to argue to avoid the objections shows the deeper problem with his entire approach.

On his podcast, Slick presented the basic argument as follows:

“...So we have 'God and not-God'. So that's called a true dichotomy. We've got either 'God exists' or 'it's not the case that God exists'... Let's take the no-God position. Can the no-God position account for the transcendental laws of logic? And the ultimate answer is, no it cannot. So therefore, because it cannot, the other position's automatically necessarily validated as being true.”

What Slick is trying to do here – as he himself has often stated – is present a disjunctive syllogism, that is, an argument with the form:

p or q
not q
therefore, p


In addition, he states that his first premise is a dichotomy – that is, that it has the form “p or not-p” – which means that it covers all possibilities, and is therefore necessarily true. That way, he has no need to argue for it.

As he states it, however, his argument is a mess, and so it takes a bit of work to turn it into a disjunctive syllogism. Taken at face value, he appears to be arguing,

1. Either God exists or God doesn't exist
2. Atheism cannot account for the laws of logic
3. Therefore, God exists.


But to begin with, this isn't a disjunctive syllogism; the second premise is not the negation of one of the disjuncts in the first premise. And what's worse is that, as it stands, this argument is clearly invalid.

To turn it into a disjunctive syllogism, we can instead restate Slick's argument as something like the following:

1. Either God accounts for the laws of logic or something else accounts for the laws of logic
2. It is not the case that something else accounts for the laws of logic
3. Therefore, God accounts for the laws of logic.


But now there is a problem with Slick's claim that his first premise is necessarily true. In the above argument, premise one is not a dichotomy. To think so is to confuse:

(A) “Either God accounts for the laws of logic or something else accounts for the laws of logic”

with:

(B) “Either God accounts for the laws of logic or God does not account for the laws of logic.”

Statement (B) is a dichotomy; statement (A) is not, for it does not cover all possibilities. For instance, it ignores the possibility that nothing accounts for the laws of logic.

Now, as it turns out, Slick actually should not be aiming at having a dichotomy as the first premise of his argument. He may think that is the way to go, so as to avoid having to argue for the premise. But as Malpass pointed out, if the first premise were a dichotomy, the argument would simply beg the question. To see why, suppose that we substitute (A) with (B) in the above argument, so that Slick would be arguing something like this:

1. Either God accounts for the laws of logic or God does not account for the laws of logic
2. It is not the case that God does not account for the laws of logic
3. Therefore, God accounts for the laws of logic.


The problem with this is that now the conclusion is just a restatement of the second premise. To say that it is not the case that God does not account for the laws of logic is simply to say that God does account for the laws of logic. In other words, the form of this latest argument is:

p or not-p
not not-p
therefore, p


But to say “not not-p” is just to say “p,” and so the argument becomes:

p or not-p
p
therefore, p


And that's not exactly a good argument.

(There is a more general problem here that Malpass didn't get into, namely, that anytime there is a logically true statement in an argument – like “p or not-p” – it can be removed without altering the argument's validity. Logical truths are not really needed to make arguments go through. This is why the first premise above is redundant, and that all that Slick would be arguing in this case is “p, therefore p.”)

So what can Slick do?

Well, he could try to keep (A) as the first premise and simply stop claiming that it is a dichotomy. However, he now needs to provide us with reasons for accepting that premise.

Let's consider that argument again:

1. Either God accounts for the laws of logic or something else accounts for the laws of logic
2. It is not the case that something else accounts for the laws of logic
3. Therefore, God accounts for the laws of logic.


This first premise is really just saying that something accounts for the laws of logic (whether that is God or not). The argument would therefore be clearer if stated as follows:

1. Something accounts for the laws of logic
2. But if God did not exist, nothing would account for the laws of logic
3. Therefore, God exists.


What Slick must do, then, is show that something must account for the laws of logic (as well as that without God, nothing would). And that's the deeper problem that I alluded to at the beginning.

Now, as Slick himself has said, what he is referring to when he talks about what accounts for logic are the “necessary preconditions” for the existence of logical truths. Or, to put it another way, what must be the case if there are to be logical truths.

One mistake Slick and other presuppositionalists make – though they are certainly not alone in this – has to do with how they understand the relationship between logical laws and that to which they apply. Given the way he argues, Slick must maintain that a rock (say) would not be identical to itself without something else, namely the “law of identity,” making it the case that the rock is identical to itself. But that's simply confusion. That rock is that rock, and that's all it takes for it to be identical to itself. There doesn't have to be in addition a logical truth that brings this fact about, and which in turn has to be accounted for.

Presuppositionalists then compound their mistake by imagining that the logical laws can only exist in the mind of God – which if anything is an even greater confusion.

Logical laws merely describe what must be the case. And since the truths they describe are necessary, there is nothing that they depend on, or even that they could possibly depend on. So not only is God not needed to account for them, but to think that God can account for them is incoherent. Slick's entire approach, then, is misguided.
​

If I had the opportunity, I'd ask Slick if he thinks it is even conceivable that logical truths could fail to hold. Does he, for example, think that (in a godless world) a rock might at the same time both exist and not exist? Or that it might be the case that all human beings are mortal, and that S is a human being, but that S is not mortal?


10 Comments
Reghardt
10/26/2017 09:59:12 am

When Malpass had the discussion with Slick on the BTWN podcast I had difficulties understanding the criticism of the argument. Since, I’ve been trying to understand some of these philosophical concepts, and I must admit this is a very well written post - Well done, I understand it so much better now. Thank you.

Reply
Franz Kiekeben
10/26/2017 12:39:49 pm

Glad to hear it. And thank you!

Reply
Terra Fehrman
7/8/2018 07:42:19 am

So you could be justified, since the laws of logic arise from innate knowledge about how the mind and the world works and corresponds to reality (ratio, rational), to just say,

"I just know."

This evens the playing field, as both of you are now at a prelogic level. The argument reduces to triviality, logically and reallly, (as Malpass predicted) in that all that can subsequently be said is "I just know,"

"No, I just know,"

"I said it first!"

Trivialities.

Reply
Franz Kiekeben
7/9/2018 09:27:31 am

Your argument presupposes the very principles of logic that you claim to be open to debate. You can't get around them while remaining coherent.

Reply
Joshua
1/6/2022 10:33:20 pm

What about forms of logic that deny these “laws”? Or even the many paradoxes that undermine them?
Presupposing something isn’t the same as having justification for it and these “laws” you refer to have never been established as valid since they are by definition assumptions (axioms).

Reply
Franz Kiekeben link
1/12/2022 05:41:00 pm

Not sure why, but my reply from a couple of days ago never posted. Anyway: I don't think the basic laws of logic require justification; I think they're just self-evident. And even though you are questioning them, your question presupposes them (e.g., your statements presuppose the law of identity, and the supposed problems you allude to presuppose the law of non-contradiction).

It's true that some deviant logics have been developed, in some cases at least in an attempt to solve (apparent) paradoxes. But if these new logics just lead to contradiction (as, e.g., the denial of excluded middle does), then why not simply accept the paradoxes as unproblematic and be done with it? Makes just as much sense.

Reply
Joshua
1/16/2022 03:02:10 pm

Because that’s the type of reasoning that leads to dogma and faith instead of debate and integrity. To simply assume things like the principles of classical logic and not address the paradoxes that undermine them is to simply shut down critical thinking.
The point is is not that these different conceptions of logic are contradictory, but that the very “laws of logic” are contradictory due to such paradoxes. Which is just one reason why they’ve been developed.
To presuppose something is to just take it at face value rather than justify it. Which implies that you don’t actually know it or have justification for it.
Since these so-called laws are by definition assumptions; they therefore are taken on faith.

Reply
Franz Kiekeben link
1/17/2022 03:25:36 pm

(1)You seem to have misunderstood me when I said "why not simply accept the paradoxes". If you read the entire sentence, you'll see that I'm saying "IF the solutions lead to contradiction, THEN why not just simply accept the paradoxes." After all, what is problematic about paradoxes? It's that they lead to contradiction, or apparent contradiction. But if contradiction isn't a problem, then the paradoxes aren't a problem!

So you see, I'm not saying we should ignore any apparent paradoxes. I'm saying the "solutions" that deny logically necessary truths are not real solutions. The actual solutions to such apparent paradoxes lie elsewhere.

(2)You say that things such as the law of identity and the law of non-contradiction need justification. But first, your claim is self-defeating, as you're already assuming these principles in the very act of making your claim. And second, your demand for justification makes no sense. To justify means to defend logically. That presupposes some laws of logic. In addition, if every law of logic itself needed justification, then what you'd have is an infinite regress, and so you'd never be justified in anything -- which again means your demand for justification makes no sense.

If you think that claims such as that there can't be round squares or married bachelors are dogmas based on faith, and therefore irrational, there's probably nothing I can tell you to convince you otherwise. But I find such irrationality (the irrationality of denying or questioning basic self-evident truths) crazy. Sorry.



Reply
Joshua
1/17/2022 04:09:24 pm

The issue with paradoxes is that it shows a contradiction within a position or belief. Such paradoxes like the problem of evil or liars paradoxes. Which is why they pose a problem. To deny that such positions lead to paradoxes is to deny the very law of noncontradiction itself. Which also implies that this supposed law undermines itself. This mainly relates to self-reference statements.
The point is not that contradictions aren’t an issue, but that to accept certain statements or propositions as true regardless of them leading to paradoxes is to go against the very law itself.
Assuming or presupposing something is not the same as believing it. One can assume something for the sake of argument in order to show that it’s inconsistent or refuted itself.
Especially when an assumptions and presuppositions are by definition unproven and unjustified. Which is an act of dogma rather than skepticism.
Self-defeating doesn’t always imply false. This is because one can develop a premise or other argument to make it more consistent.
The only reason people can’t think of a bachelor being married or round squares is because they are described in ways which we have defined them. Thsi can also lead to issue though given that we still don’t have a universal definition for what a “word” is. Nor do we have a consensus on a theory of meaning.
If you simply take a folk theory of truth which includes the normativity principle; which includes the law of noncontradiction, t-schema, capture and release semantics, and “it’s usually good to believe what is true”, then you find yourself in a contradiction due to paradoxes like the liar or other similar contradictions.

Reply
Franz Kiekeben link
1/18/2022 02:53:32 pm

I've already made my (i.e., the correct) position as clear as I probably can, so it's not gonna be useful continuing this discussion any further, except perhaps to reply to specific points you make that should be answered. So I'll limit my comments to that.

"The only reason people can’t think of a bachelor being married or round squares is because they are described in ways which we have defined them."

No. The logical problem with married bachelor is not due to the definition, it's due to what the definition means -- IOW, it's a problem regarding the incompatibility of the concepts involved. You can redefine words all you want, it doesn't help one bit. A bachelor (what that word as I'm using it here now refers to) cannot be married (what that word as I'm using it here now refers to).

"The issue with paradoxes is that it shows a contradiction within a position or belief."

Wrong. The term "paradox" is unfortunately ambiguous, and can mean (among other things!) both something contradictory as well as something only apparently contradictory. Thus a paradox may only show an apparent problem. You can't just assume that it shows an actual problem.

You seem to be dogmatically certain that, e.g., the liar paradox shows that classical logic is false, and that we need therefore to accept a paraconsistent logic in which contradictions are allowed. There are only two slight problems with that view. First, no paraconsistent logic, even if we ignore other problems with it, can solve the paradox (at least I've never seen a solution that works). Second, there seems to be a perfectly reasonable (and not even that hard to come by) solution to the paradox that is consistent with classical logic.

Consider first the paraconsistent solution which says that both A and not-A can be true at the same time (so that "this sentence is false" is both true and not true). We can represent this in a Venn diagram in which the circles for "A" and "not-A" overlap. In such a diagram, there are three areas, the A's that aren't also not-A's, the not-A's that aren't also A's, and the A's that are also not-A's (you could add a fourth, an outside area that is neither A nor not-A, but it makes no difference for the point I'm making, so I'll leave that out). The fact that there are some A's that are also not-A's is the non-classical move here that is supposed to resolve the paradox. Only it doesn't.

Why not? Because I can now simply define another logical operator, call it "shnot", such that everything outside of the area of A's is shnot-A. IOW, shnot-A's are only those not-A's that aren't also A's. And now, I can just re-introduce the paradox that the paraconsistent logic was meant to solve by writing, "this sentence is shnot true." All the paraconsistent move achieved was to stave off the paradox for a little while. Not very impressive, if you ask me.

The actual solution to the liar paradox is that a statement such as "this sentence is false" fails to express an actual proposition (just as "square circle" fails to express an actual concept). To say "this sentence is false" is no different than saying "there is a proposition that holds even though it does not hold", and much like saying "my friend Tom is a married bachelor". All such statements fail to convey anything meaningful as a whole (even though their individual components are perfectly meaningful). It literally makes no sense to say such things. If I ask someone, "Consider the proposition that both holds and does not hold; does it hold?", they should simply reply that there is no such proposition. No problem. Similarly, no actual proposition is expressed by "this sentence is false". The only problem is that it appears to express an actual proposition.

So there is no actual contradiction as a result of the liar paradox; it's nothing more than a linguistic puzzle.

Reply



Leave a Reply.

    Archives

    April 2022
    May 2021
    April 2021
    March 2021
    October 2020
    September 2020
    August 2020
    May 2020
    April 2020
    March 2020
    February 2020
    January 2020
    December 2019
    November 2019
    October 2019
    September 2019
    August 2019
    July 2019
    May 2019
    April 2019
    March 2019
    January 2019
    December 2018
    November 2018
    October 2018
    September 2018
    August 2018
    July 2018
    June 2018
    May 2018
    April 2018
    March 2018
    February 2018
    January 2018
    December 2017
    November 2017
    October 2017
    September 2017
    August 2017
    July 2017
    June 2017
    May 2017
    March 2017
    February 2017
    January 2017
    December 2016
    November 2016
    September 2016
    August 2016
    July 2016
    May 2016
    April 2016
    March 2016
    February 2016
    January 2016
    December 2015
    November 2015
    October 2015
    September 2015
    August 2015
    July 2015
    May 2015
    April 2015
    March 2015
    February 2015
    January 2015
    December 2014
    November 2014
    October 2014
    September 2014
    August 2014
    July 2014
    June 2014

    Categories

    All
    Atheism
    Creationism
    Determinism And Free Will
    Ethics
    Infinity
    Politics And Religion
    Presuppositionalism

    RSS Feed

Link to my author's page on Amazon