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A TIMELESS GOD AND THEOLOGICAL DETERMINISM

10/31/2017

10 Comments

 
Many theists believe both in a god with infallible knowledge about the future and in libertarian free will, and thus face the problem of how to reconcile these two ideas. An attempted solution which has come up in the comments section here more than once is the so-called “Boethian solution.” It maintains that God is outside of time, and so does not actually have foreknowledge. From his extra-temporal vantage point, God sees all of time — past, present, and future — all “at once,” so to speak. Therefore, he does not foresee what you’re going to do tomorrow; rather, he sees it, much as we see the present. 

The most common reply to this is to point out — correctly, in my opinion — that a timeless god is a contradiction in terms. But there is another problem with the Boethian solution, which is that, even if we set aside problems with timelessness, it doesn’t work! 

To understand why, it’s important to first be clear on what the problem of theological determinism is. God’s foreknowledge implies that there is only one possible future: the only events that can happen are the ones God knows will occur. It is this that is incompatible with the kind of freedom most people believe in. The Boethian solution therefore can only work if it allows there to be more than one possible future. And yet it’s pretty clear that it doesn’t. 

To begin with, the Boethian solution is a perfect “have your cake and eat it too” kind of move. It is an attempt to find a way for God to know the future (while it is still the future) without, however, knowing it beforehand. Contrast this with “open theism,” which says that God only knows what happens once it happens (and thus does not know the future). The Boethian claims that God knows everything that happens because he “sees” it happening — just like the open theist does. However, because God sees it, not as it is happening, but rather from outside of time, he supposedly does not have to wait until it happens. Simple, right? 

Not so fast. Here’s the problem: if there is more than one possible future, then there is more than one set of future events compatible with what is happening right now. But from God’s timeless vantage point, what is happening now and what happens in the future are combined into one overall set of events. Thus, from his vantage point, there isn’t more than one possible set of events in the future to go along with the present. Our present is combined with one-and-only-one possible tomorrow, since they are together present before God’s eyes. It follows that there can only be one possible future — and therefore, no free will. 

By analogy, when we watch a movie, it seems that the characters are making free decisions — but of course we know that they aren’t: there is only one possible set of events that can play out, since the entire movie is already on the reel. If God is outside of time looking at it as a whole, he is seeing it much the same way as we would see a movie reel. The scenes of our lives are all already there, and thus can only turn out one way. The Boethian solution therefore implies that there is only one possible set of events for us to perform. It doesn’t avoid theological determinism.

​

[Originally published at Debunking Christianity]

10 Comments
Andy Bates
11/9/2017 01:35:42 pm

I notice that you deleted all my comments on your earlier post about this topic. That says a lot about your intellectual honesty regarding this discussion. But since you continue to make the same mistakes, I guess I'll continue to point them out.

"But from God’s timeless vantage point, what is happening now and what happens in the future are combined into one overall set of events. Thus, from his vantage point, there isn’t more than one possible set of events in the future to go along with the present."

Not at all. Again, you are making a false equivalence between "actual events" and "possible events." From God's vantage point, there is only one ACTUAL set of events that will occur. But there remain numerous POSSIBLE events that will occur.

Look at it from this perspective: From our point of view, there is one set of events that happened in the past. Abraham Lincoln was assassinated. George Washington was the first U.S. President. The Declaration of Independence was signed on July 4, 1776. But do we say that those events are the only POSSIBLE set of events that could have happened? Of course not. We can conceive of the possibility that the Declaration of Independence could have been signed a day earlier or later, or that Abraham Lincoln decided not to go to the play and hence wasn't assassinated. The fact of what DID occur does not change the POSSIBILITY of what COULD HAVE occurred.

Similarly, God knows what WILL occur, but that doesn't change the possibility of what COULD occur. The only thing that is necessary is that (God knows X AND X is true). Logically, the fact that God knows X does not mean that X is necessarily true.

"By analogy, when we watch a movie, it seems that the characters are making free decisions — but of course we know that they aren’t: there is only one possible set of events that can play out, since the entire movie is already on the reel."

No, the events that play out in the movie are the ACTUAL events that played out. But if you've ever seen deleted scenes or alternate endings, you know that the movie had other POSSIBLE endings that could have happened. But there is only one ACTUAL ending.

I look forward to your response.

Reply
Maik
12/5/2020 09:56:59 pm

The idea that god "thinks" about what could have happened doesn't make the idea of a timeless, all knowing creator less disturbing and it still would not make sense for him to causally intervene.

Reply
Franz Kiekeben link
11/9/2017 05:53:30 pm

Here we go again. I’m not going to give you the satisfaction of debating this topic again because I refuse to engage dishonest and rude individuals. (Plus the points you make this time around are so poor, they're laughable.) I am perfectly willing to debate those who disagree with me – including those who know a lot more about this topic than you – and in fact did so just recently with a religious PhD in philosophy.

I will, however, explain and justify the deletion of the comment thread from that previous post. There were two main reasons:

First, because it was a source of irritation to me (and I don’t want my own website to contain such a thing). The thread consisted mostly of you claiming I made a simple error (that of going from “Necessarily, if God knows x, then x” to “God knows x, therefore necessarily x”) and me explaining in a variety of ways that that’s not what I was doing – that I was instead claiming “god knows x, therefore necessarily x” on different grounds. It is my contention that you understood what I was saying, but dishonestly pretended not to – after all, it doesn’t take any more to grasp the above point than to understand that “if a, then b” is different than “b,” for reasons other than a. Plus, on at least two occasions I quoted recognized authorities on this who agreed with me – and did you reply to what they said? No (surprise, surprise) – you conveniently ignored what they said. This clearly demonstrates your dishonesty.

Second, I recently received an email from someone actually praising me for how I responded to you, and had to tell them I disagree! I was not by any means satisfied with my side of the debate. I was frustrated by you, became noticeably angry, and as a result replied in too impatient a way, leading to (a) a couple of times, at least, when I wasn’t as clear as I should have been, and (b) more importantly, missing several opportunities to make better points. And I did not like the fact that someone was reading sub-par writings from me (even if only in a comments section).

I won’t delete anything you reply at this point provided you’re not a jerk. But, as I’ve already explained, I’m not going to engage in a debate with you. It’s a complete waste of time, much as that thread was a complete waste of space. (Note: saying things like “You obviously must know you’re wrong, or you’d be willing to debate” IS being a jerk - just so you know.)

I will soon be posting another entry that deals with theological determinism over at Debunking Christianity, and will almost certainly be engaged in debate with that aforementioned PhD. I won’t mind at all. And if – though I don’t expect it – he proves me wrong, I will gladly admit I’m wrong. The difference is that in that case it will be because he actually can make good points – and he’s not a jerk about it.

Have a nice day.

Reply
Andy Bates
11/10/2017 09:51:11 am

Since you seem to interpret any disagreement as me being a "jerk", I'm not sure how I can respond without you taking it the wrong way. All I can do is state my case, and let you react how you're going to react.

I'm not sure why I expected anything different this time around, since you are responding the same way you did before: with a combination of appeals to authority, complaining about my tone instead of addressing my points, and saying, "Your points are so laughably wrong that I'm not even going to bother responding." If you're going to have a blog about philosophy, it seems counterintuitive that you would not want to actually defend your points.

"I am perfectly willing to debate those who disagree with me – including those who know a lot more about this topic than you – and in fact did so just recently with a religious PhD in philosophy."

Once again, you use the Appeal to Authority fallacy. "I'm not going to debate you, but I recently debated someone who knows more about this topic than you."

"The thread consisted mostly of you claiming I made a simple error (that of going from 'Necessarily, if God knows x, then x' to 'God knows x, therefore necessarily x') and me explaining in a variety of ways that that’s not what I was doing – that I was instead claiming 'god knows x, therefore necessarily x' on different grounds."

And as I repeatedly pointed out to you, whenever you say "God knows X, therefore necessarily X", that IS the Modal Fallacy! One event or circumstance or truth can't lead to "...therefore necessarily X." Every proposition is either logically necessary or logically contingent. And if something is necessary, that means it is true in all possible universes. That's why your statement "God knows X, therefore necessarily X" is wrong for any value of X (unless X is something that is necessarily true on its own).

"It is my contention that you understood what I was saying, but dishonestly pretended not to"

No, that is simply untrue. I was being completely honest in disagreeing with you.

" – after all, it doesn’t take any more to grasp the above point than to understand that 'if a, then b' is different than 'b,' for reasons other than a."

You're trying to structure your argument in logical terms, then talking about "reasons" which have no place in such an argument. If you're saying "If A, then necessarily B", then you are committing the Modal Fallacy, regardless of what you think the reasons are that B is true.

"Plus, on at least two occasions I quoted recognized authorities on this who agreed with me – and did you reply to what they said? No (surprise, surprise) – you conveniently ignored what they said. This clearly demonstrates your dishonesty."

No, that means that I would like to hear your arguments, instead of you using an Appeal to Authority fallacy. But again, you deleted all my responses, so I can't point out how I actually responded.

"(Note: saying things like “You obviously must know you’re wrong, or you’d be willing to debate” IS being a jerk - just so you know.)"

Which is exactly what you did above, when you said to me, "It is my contention that you understood what I was saying, but dishonestly pretended not to."

Reply
Franz Kiekeben
11/10/2017 03:09:02 pm

To anyone else who might be reading this: As I said, I will not debate this person. This is based on the fact that when I did engage him in the past, he merely ignored what I said and kept repeating the same old tired argument over and over until I gave up. And in addition was rude about it. And then claimed victory because I gave up.

Hopefully, those who read what he has written here this time will immediately see that he's either deluded and/or dishonest. (E.g., consider his outrageous accusation that I'm committing the fallacy of appealing to authority!) I've also already explained to him that the kind of necessity under discussion here is not logical necessity. So again, either he just doesn't understand, or he's being disingenuous.

Andy Bates
11/10/2017 10:56:32 am

"But from God’s timeless vantage point, what is happening now and what happens in the future are combined into one overall set of events. Thus, from his vantage point, there isn’t more than one possible set of events in the future to go along with the present. Our present is combined with one-and-only-one possible tomorrow, since they are together present before God’s eyes. It follows that there can only be one possible future — and therefore, no free will."

Again, you're confusing "actual" with "possible", and assuming your conclusion in order to prove your conclusion. It's the Modal Fallacy again, just rephrased differently.

Think of it this way: You hold a photograph in your hand of event X that happened in the past. You say, "I have a photograph of X happening in the past; therefore, it is necessarily true that X happened in the past. Because if X didn't happen, then this picture would be wrong, and it's impossible to have a photograph of something that didn't happen!"

But that logic is incorrect: Having a photograph of X doesn't cause X to be necessary, and nothing that happened in the past is necessary just by the fact of it being in the past. If you have a photograph of X, then X remains contingent; if Y had happened instead, then you would have a photograph of Y. And similarly, if X happens in the future, then God knows X in the present (definition of omniscience). And if Y happens in the future, then God knows Y in the present. God's infallible knowledge of something does not lead to the conclusion that that thing is necessary.

That's as simple as I can explain it.

Reply
Andy Bates
11/10/2017 04:11:02 pm

To anyone else who might be reading this: As I said, I will not debate this person. This is based on the fact that when I did engage him in the past, he merely ignored what I said and kept repeating the same old tired argument over and over until I gave up. And in addition was rude about it. And then claimed victory because I gave up.

"I've also already explained to him that the kind of necessity under discussion here is not logical necessity. So again, either he just doesn't understand, or he's being disingenuous."

You're making a logical argument, but you're not talking about logical necessity? What other kind of necessity is there? And if I don't understand, then why not try explaining it to me?

If you want to talk about being disingenuous, a pretty good example is completely deleting an entire conversation, then claiming that you won that argument. Or saying that you aren't going to debate me on a topic, and then saying, "Well I already explained my points (in a deleted conversation that you can't read), so I'm not going to explain them again!"

So, if it's not logical necessity, then what kind of necessity is it? Can you even explain that simple point?

Reply
Franz Kiekeben
11/11/2017 09:38:17 am

Again, I'm not going to debate you, and I've already explained why - as well as why I deleted that former comment thread. I should never have engaged you to the extent I did, but it took me a while to realize that you're just playing games. Well, I'm not going to give you the pleasure this time. Sorry.

As further evidence that you're merely playing games - that your sole purpose here is to try to make me look bad - consider that you are now acting surprised that there is something other than logical necessity! This is something that was discussed on that previous thread, over several comments. And you never raised such a question then. (I almost which now that I hadn't deleted it!) Again, you're just playing games, and I'm not falling for it.

"You're making a logical argument, but you're not talking about logical necessity?"

This one made me laugh. So thank you for that.

Reply
Andy Bates
11/11/2017 12:15:55 pm

“As further evidence that you're merely playing games - that your sole purpose here is to try to make me look bad - consider that you are now acting surprised that there is something other than logical necessity! This is something that was discussed on that previous thread, over several comments. And you never raised such a question then. (I almost which now that I hadn't deleted it!)”

No, I’m asking you to actually explain your argument, but you seem unable to do so. I’m not even sure you understand what you mean by “possible” and “necessity” here, since you are unwilling to engage on even simple questions.

And you’re not fooling anyone: Of course you’re glad you deleted the thread! Because that’s what allows you to say, over and over again, “I already answered that question in the other thread!” without actually producing that argument. But that’s okay, because you are more concerned with criticizing my tone and complaining that I’m arguing in bad faith, than actually defending your arguments.

Reply
Franz Kiekeben
11/11/2017 09:54:09 am

For anyone interested in understanding the topic of theological determinism further, here are a few recommendations:

Robert Kane, A CONTEMPORARY INTRODUCTION TO FREE WILL, Chpt. 13, explains the problem in a way that is very readable and easy to follow.

William Hasker, "God, Time, Knowledge and Freedom: The Historical Matrix", in Robert Kane, ed., FREE WILL, provides a historical overview.

For a criticism of the argument, see Linda Zagzebski "Foreknowledge and Free Will" in the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/free-will-foreknowledge/). I'm not convinced that the criticisms she gives show there is no problem - not by a long shot - but at least her criticisms are serious ones.

Zagzebski is (or was) also a proponent of a view that I used to dismiss, but which I've now come to see as the only viable way out for the proponent of libertarian free will who wants to believe in divine foreknowledge, the so-called Frankfurtian solution.

For a defense of that view, see David Hunt, "The Simple-Foreknowledge View," in James Beilby and Paul Eddy, eds., DIVINE FOREKNOWLEDGE: FOUR VIEWS. Hunt, by the way, explains clearly the kind of necessity theological determinism involves.

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