ANOTHER PROBLEM WITH THE BOETHIAN SOLUTION

11/16/2017

This may be beating a dead horse, but since some people are convinced the horse is alive and well, here’s something else that's wrong with the Boethian attempt to escape theological determinism.

According to Boethians, God doesn’t have foreknowledge of one’s future actions because God is outside of time. He therefore does not foresee what we are going to do, he timelessly sees what we are going to do. And that, they claim, means that we remain free to choose among different possible courses of action.

I’ve already argued that this doesn’t solve the problem (see my blog post from 10/31/17, A Timeless God and Theological Determinism). But even if you disagree with my criticism in that earlier post, there's another reason for rejecting this Boethian solution. For even supposing God is timeless, it is still the case that as an omnipotent being, he ought to be able to make himself temporal. One must accept this as a possibility unless it is metaphysically impossible for God to exist in time — and that’s something the theist would have to argue for. Moreover, this would be especially difficult for a Christian to maintain, for obvious reasons. And yet, as a temporal being, it seems clear that God would be able to foresee the future if he so chose. After all, it would take nothing more out of the ordinary than remembering what he already knew during his timeless existence.

The problem here isn’t (as Linda Zagzebski implies in her Stanford Encyclopedia article https://plato.stanford.edu/ entries/free-will-foreknowledge/) whether or not Jesus actually had infallible foreknowledge. If it were, then this would be of concern only to Christians — and they could easily escape it by pointing out that there are reasons for denying Jesus had such knowledge. After all, he himself claimed he didn’t know exactly when the world would end. Moreover (though Christians will be less happy to admit this), he was way off when he predicted it would happen during the lifetime of some of his contemporaries.

No, the problem is wider than that. It is that God could be in time and know the future. It is important to realize that the problem of foreknowledge is not essentially a problem with there actually being such knowledge; it is a problem about it being possible for there to be such knowledge. So long as there is the possibility that someone could know the future infallibly, the future cannot be open to different possibilities. And the Boethian, it seems, must admit that God could have such foreknowledge.

[Originally published at Debunking Christianity]

32 Comments

Andy Bates

11/16/2017 02:54:27 pm

"So long as there is the possibility that someone could know the future infallibly, the future cannot be open to different possibilities."

Every time I order a meal at a restaurant (let's call it time T), there is a moment before I order (let's say T-N) when I infallibly know exactly what I am going to order at T. Does my infallible knowledge at T-N of what I'm going to order mean there is no possibility that I could have ordered something different at T?

Franz Kiekeben

11/16/2017 06:07:43 pm

I'll reply and see where this goes, though I'm not hopeful...

If at T-N you infallibly know that you will order x at T, then yes, AT THAT POINT you no longer can order anything else at T. Because to infallibly know what your decision will be means you have made a decision you can no longer unmake. ("Infallibly" - as the term is used in this context - doesn't just mean "always right"; it means "without the possibility of being wrong." It follows that if it was open to you to change your mind, then by definition you wouldn't have known your decision infallibly.)

The problem with this example, of course, is that it isn't based on reality. In real life, you don't ever actually have such infallible knowledge. Even if you think to yourself, "I'm definitely going to order x," it doesn't mean you can't change your mind.

Andy Bates

11/16/2017 08:25:13 pm

"The problem with this example, of course, is that it isn't based on reality. In real life, you don't ever actually have such infallible knowledge. Even if you think to yourself, "I'm definitely going to order x," it doesn't mean you can't change your mind."

But it doesn't matter if you change your mind, because no matter what you change your mind to, there is always some point (conveniently labeled as T-N) at which you infallibly know what you are going to order. You can't order something without first having infallible knowledge of that order at some point prior to the ac of ordering.

So, by your logic, no one is free to order food at a restaurant, because the infallible foreknowledge of that order at time T-N mean that it is not possible for them to order anything else at time T. There is always only one possible future, and that's the future where you order X at time T. Therefore, no one has free will.

Franz Kiekeben

11/17/2017 10:24:38 am

It’s not entirely clear whether you’re talking about the decision to act or the act itself; you seem to be conflating the two. Anyway, you should be talking about the former. But if so, then what you’re describing is the point at which you make your final decision, and not some point prior to it. So long as you have any other thoughts on the matter after some time T-x, you can change your mind. And if you don’t have any other thoughts on the matter after T-x, then that means you HAVE made your final decision. Understood this way, then, all your argument shows is that ONCE YOU’VE MADE your final decision, you can no longer change it. Well, that just follows from the meaning of “final.” That’s not a challenge to the doctrine of free will at all. A decision fails to be free (in the standard libertarian sense) only if PRIOR to making it, what it will be has already been determined.

But since you distinguished between T-N and the time you ACT on your decision – the act of ordering – you also appear to be arguing that if there is a delay between your final decision and when you act on it, then, given infallible foreknowledge of your own action, that means the action isn’t free. But that doesn’t follow. If free will exists, it is because our DECISIONS are free. A free act is just an act that one freely decided to perform. To put it another way, the freedom is in the act only derivatively.

Furthermore, if this second argument were right, then there wouldn’t be free will, not just because we would have infallible foreknowledge of our future acts, but also because our future acts are causally determined by our prior decisions. IOW, the fact that the act follows causally from the decision is enough to make the same point. Since our acts are causally determined by our decisions, then by this logic, they aren’t free. But that obviously doesn’t follow.

Andy Bates

11/17/2017 10:58:57 am

"It’s not entirely clear whether you’re talking about the decision to act or the act itself; you seem to be conflating the two. Anyway, you should be talking about the former."

I'm talking about the act itself, because I infallibly know what I'm going to do (at time T) before I do it (at time T-N). Therefore, by the logic you've already stated, there is only one possible action I can do at time T.

"Understood this way, then, all your argument shows is that ONCE YOU’VE MADE your final decision, you can no longer change it. Well, that just follows from the meaning of 'final.' That’s not a challenge to the doctrine of free will at all."

How can it not be a challenge to free will if I'm locked into one possible future? If at time T-N I know that I'm going to order X at time T, then according to your logic, the only possible future is the one where I order X at time T. Therefore, any free will must be an illusion, because there is only one possible future: where I do X at time T.

"A decision fails to be free (in the standard libertarian sense) only if PRIOR to making it, what it will be has already been determined."

You previously used the term "known", and now you're using "determined". Is there a reason why you're changing the term from passive knowledge to active decision-making?

"But since you distinguished between T-N and the time you ACT on your decision – the act of ordering – you also appear to be arguing that if there is a delay between your final decision and when you act on it, then, given infallible foreknowledge of your own action, that means the action isn’t free. But that doesn’t follow. If free will exists, it is because our DECISIONS are free. A free act is just an act that one freely decided to perform. To put it another way, the freedom is in the act only derivatively."

Then you can extend the same logic backwards: If I make my final decision at T-N, then there must be a point at T-N-M when I infallibly know what my decision at T-N is going to be. And as long as there is the possibility that I know my decision at T-N before I actually make it, then by your logic, the future cannot be open to other possibilities at T-N.

"Since our acts are causally determined by our decisions, then by this logic, they aren’t free. But that obviously doesn’t follow."

Why doesn't it follow? You're the one claiming that infallible foreknowledge of an event means that there is only one possible future. But now you're claiming that "obviously that doesn't follow." If it doesn't follow, then why not? Because it sounds like you're just demonstrating that your logic leads to illogical conclusions, which means your reasoning must be fundamentally flawed.

Franz Kiekeben

11/18/2017 09:41:29 am

You’re doing it again: just repeating the same points without addressing what I said (other than to say things like “why not?”, even though I clearly explained why not).

And amazingly, in response to this: "A decision fails to be free (in the standard libertarian sense) only if PRIOR to making it, what it will be has already been determined."

you ask:

“You previously used the term "known", and now you're using "determined". Is there a reason why you're changing the term from passive knowledge to active decision-making?”

Are you actually claiming not to know that we’ve been discussing determinism? Even though the issue we are discussing (which you interestingly keep referring as to “my argument”, as if I’m the only one who argues this) is theological DETERMINISM? Also, I didn’t say anything about “active decision-making” in the above.

Moving on. To my: "Understood this way, then, all your argument shows is that ONCE YOU’VE MADE your final decision, you can no longer change it. Well, that just follows from the meaning of 'final.' That’s not a challenge to the doctrine of free will at all."

you replied:

“How can it not be a challenge to free will if I'm locked into one possible future? If at time T-N I know that I'm going to order X at time T, then according to your logic, the only possible future is the one where I order X at time T. Therefore, any free will must be an illusion, because there is only one possible future: where I do X at time T.”

But I’ve already explained this. Basically, your argument is: suppose I decide to do x at T-N, and then (say one 10th of a second later, at T), my muscles move in the appropriate manner. Since I had already decided what I was going to do at T-N, it follows that my movements at T aren’t free: they follow inexorably from my prior decision.

Now, I’m not sure you’re even serious or just trying to obfuscate matters. But obviously free WILL is about the act of WILLING which is a MENTAL act. It is not about the muscle movements, but about the DECISION to move one’s muscles or whatever. The question whether the act is free comes in at the moment you make the decision. If you could have made a different decision, your act is free in the standard libertarian sense. If not, then it isn’t. The fact that once you have made your final decision you have locked yourself in to a particular behavioral pattern does not mean your decision wasn’t free.

You seem to be confused by the fact that an act that has been determined by your decision is determined – and that since it is determined, it cannot be free. Nonsense. (And don’t ask “why is it nonsense?” at this point, as you are probably planning to do. It’s what I have just explained. See above.)

The more interesting aspect of all this is that you introduced the above as an argument against theological determinism - claiming that if theological determinism is true, then the above would also be true, meaning our own infallible knowledge of what our final decisions are would make us unfree. And yet, as I’ve shown (and as is obvious anyway), if sound, your argument would show that we are unfree regardless. But you also conveniently sidestepped that issue, stating (without even attempting to reply to my point) that it shows theological determinism is fundamentally flawed.

“If I make my final decision at T-N, then there must be a point at T-N-M when I infallibly know what my decision at T-N is going to be.”

Yeah, just keep pretending I didn’t already address this.

One more thing: Even though this is really a side issue - which I ignored so far in order to avoid complications - it is not strictly speaking true that you have infallible knowledge of your act even after you make your final decision – after all, there can be unforeseen external events interfering with your ability to carry out your decision.

Andy Bates

11/20/2017 01:08:46 am

"You’re doing it again: just repeating the same points without addressing what I said"

No, I am specifically addressing what you said, although my responses sometimes require repeating points that either A) I didn't make clearly enough, or B) you didn't understand. That's called "having a discussion." When two people disagree on something, they often repeat the same points, phrasing them in different ways, until the other person finally understands. Can we just have a conversation, instead of you hyper-analyzing my comments and telling me why I shouldn't be clarifying points?

"(other than to say things like “why not?”, even though I clearly explained why not)."

See, what you're doing is NOT helpful to the conversation. I'm asking you to clarify and explain the logical leaps you're making, and your response is "Well I already explained that." Again, if you'd explained it perfectly, then I wouldn't be asking you to clarify it.

"Are you actually claiming not to know that we’ve been discussing determinism? Even though the issue we are discussing (which you interestingly keep referring as to “my argument”, as if I’m the only one who argues this) is theological DETERMINISM?"

Yes of course I know we're discussing theological determinism! Specifically, you're claiming that theological determinism is logically sound, while I'm claiming that your arguments are logically unsound. But determinism is supposed to be the conclusion to your argument; if you start off with "the future has already been determined," then you're assuming your conclusion.

And the reason I'm calling it "your argument" is because I'm talking to YOU and it's the argument that YOU are currently making. I'm addressing YOUR blog post. My statement implies absolutely nothing about whether or not other people have made the same arguments.

"Also, I didn’t say anything about “active decision-making” in the above."

Knowledge is passive; determination is active. If I say, "I know I'm having lasagna for dinner tonight," that does not imply anything about WHY I am having lasagna. But if I say, "I have determined that I will be having lasagna tonight," that implies that it is an active choice on my part, that I am taking steps to make sure I have lasagna for dinner.

So again, instead of your rephrased statement:

"A decision fails to be free (in the standard libertarian sense) only if PRIOR to making it, what it will be has already been determined."

(which assumes its conclusion), I would like to focus on your original statement from the blog post:

"So long as there is the possibility that someone could know the future infallibly, the future cannot be open to different possibilities."

"Now, I’m not sure you’re even serious or just trying to obfuscate matters."

Again, can you stop with these little sniping comments?? Yes, I am completely serious about this discussion and my beliefs. No, I'm not trying to obfuscate anything. If this discussion seems confusing to you, then maybe you should actually concentrate on the discussion, and stop questioning my motives every other paragraph.

"But obviously free WILL is about the act of WILLING which is a MENTAL act. It is not about the muscle movements, but about the DECISION to move one’s muscles or whatever."

So if two men decide to walk, then Person A with normal motor functions is precisely as free as Person B who is paralyzed from the waist down? That doesn't seem to make sense. It seems that the second man is less free, because he has physical constraints on his free will.

"The question whether the act is free comes in at the moment you make the decision. If you could have made a different decision, your act is free in the standard libertarian sense. If not, then it isn’t. The fact that once you have made your final decision you have locked yourself in to a particular behavioral pattern does not mean your decision wasn’t free."

If I decide at T-N that I'm going to do X, and you say I'm "locked into a particular behavioral pattern", does that mean that there is only one possible future at T, the one where I do X? Because I want to know exactly what you mean when you say "the future can't be open to different possibilities."

"The more interesting aspect of all this is that you introduced the above as an argument against theological determinism - claiming that if theological determinism is true, then the above would also be true, meaning our own infallible knowledge of what our final decisions are would make us unfree. And yet, as I’ve shown (and as is obvious anyway), if sound, your argument would show that we are unfree regardless. But you also conveniently sidestepped that issue, stating (without even attempting to reply to my point) that it shows theological determinism is fundamentally flawed."

I ignored your comment because it doesn't affect my argument one whit. My point is that YOUR LOGIC regardin

Andy Bates

11/20/2017 01:11:09 am

You know what? Let me try a different tactic: I would like you to clarify precisely one definition for me:

When you say, "So long as there is the possibility that someone could know the future infallibly, the future cannot be open to different possibilities."

,,,How do you define "possible"? In other words, what exactly do you mean when you say, "the future cannot be open to different possibilities"? Because I'm convinced that your definition of "possible" does not match the accepted and commonly-used definition of "possible."

Franz Kiekeben

11/20/2017 07:47:36 am

“Can we just have a conversation, instead of you hyper-analyzing my comments and telling me why I shouldn't be clarifying points?”

No, because we’ve been through this before. Two-and-a-half years ago, I gave you the benefit of the doubt for a long time, only to find out you were playing games. You do not ever intend to actually take into consideration anything I’m saying. Your sole purpose is to try to discredit my arguments no matter what. You have already decided ahead of time that what I’m going to say is wrong, and therefore when I say it, your only goal is to try to come up with anything – no matter how ridiculous or irrelevant – to say against it. It is for this reason that so far, exactly zero progress has been made in these discussions. They’ve been completely pointless.

Example: I presented two refutations to your latest argument. Your response to the first was to restate your original points more or less as if I hadn’t said anything. And to the second, which provides as clear-cut a refutation as anyone could ask for, your response was this:

“I ignored your comment because it doesn't affect my argument one whit.”

That pretty much says it all.

Now, it is possible that you really don’t understand much of what I’m saying. For example, when you complain that my description of an unfree act ("A decision fails to be free… only if PRIOR to making it, what it will be has already been determined") merely “assumes its conclusion” maybe you really are utterly confused, as opposed to playing games. But unfortunately, no good can come of my trying to explain why your complaint is misplaced. You would just come back with some other, apparently random, complaint.

I’m sorry, but this just isn’t worth my time.

Andy Bates

11/20/2017 01:15:45 pm

"No, because we’ve been through this before. Two-and-a-half years ago, I gave you the benefit of the doubt for a long time, only to find out you were playing games. You do not ever intend to actually take into consideration anything I’m saying."

No, I am taking into consideration everything you're saying, but as long as you continue to make logical errors and incorrect assumptions, I will continue to disagree with you. It's not my fault that you are unable to make a reasonable and convincing argument.

And in point of fact, this is exactly the same tactic you used two and a half years ago: You would make a point, I would explain my disagreement, and then you would complain that you'd already explained yourself (but were unwilling to explain again), or that somehow I was "playing games" and unwilling to listen to your arguments. This is how you always respond when your logic is questioned. I can't even ask a simple question like "How do you define 'possible'?" without you pointing fingers and refusing to answer.

Your sole purpose is to try to discredit my arguments no matter what.

"Discredit" means "to ruin the reputation of someone or something." An argument is a construct of facts and logic; it does not have a reputation. I am simply attempting to disprove your arguments, because they are logically unsound.

"You have already decided ahead of time that what I’m going to say is wrong"

And again, you confuse the act of deciding something with the fact of knowing something. I didn't "decide" that your arguments are wrong; I observed that your arguments are wrong by reading them and noting how they lead to contradictory conclusion.

"Example: I presented two refutations to your latest argument. Your response to the first was to restate your original points more or less as if I hadn’t said anything. And to the second, which provides as clear-cut a refutation as anyone could ask for, your response was this:

“I ignored your comment because it doesn't affect my argument one whit.”

That pretty much says it all."

I didn't realize that your system truncated my comments. Here is the complete response:

I ignored your comment because it doesn't affect my argument one whit. My point is that YOUR

LOGIC regarding theological determinism leads to the conclusion that no one can ever have free

will. And your response is that your logic also proves that we don't have free will, but in a

completely different way? Great, then there are TWO reasons to accept that your logic is

unsound! I didn't feel like this was a relevant addition.

"I’m sorry, but this just isn’t worth my time."

Yeah, why bother defending your arguments on your own personal blog?

Andy Bates

11/20/2017 01:24:26 pm

Instead of asking you questions about your arguments, I will just point out where you are factually incorrect and be done with it:

"So long as there is the possibility that someone could know the future infallibly, the future cannot be open to different possibilities."

This is the part that is completely, logically, and factually incorrect. And again, this is the same Modal Fallacy that you have made many times in the past. Something in the future is either CONTINGENT (i.e. POSSIBLE), or NECESSARY (or as you put it, "not open to different possibilities"). If an event is contingent, then something can't MAKE it necessary.

So the statement, "So long as there is the possibility that someone could know the future infallibly, the future cannot be open to different possibilities." is incorrect, because it's saying that knowledge at time T-N (or the possibility of knowledge) make the event at time T necessary, which is logically unsound.

So if God knows that I will do X at time T, how can I have multiple possibilities at time T? Simple! Like this:

Possible World 1: God knows I will do X at time T; I do X and time T.
Possible World 2: God knows I will do Y at time T; I do Y and time T.
Possible World 3: God knows I will do Z at time T; I do Z and time T.
Possible World 4: God knows I will do A at time T; I do A and time T.
Possible World 5: God knows I will do B at time T; I do B and time T.
Possible World 6: God knows I will do C at time T; I do C and time T.

...and so on, for every single act which is physically possible for me to do at time T. As long as there is a possible world where I do that event, it remains possible. The fact that a being knows that event at time T-N does not change its possibility.

Franz Kiekeben

11/20/2017 11:04:03 pm

"Something in the future is either CONTINGENT (i.e. POSSIBLE), or NECESSARY (or as you put it, "not open to different possibilities"). If an event is contingent, then something can't MAKE it necessary.

"So the statement, "So long as there is the possibility that someone could know the future infallibly, the future cannot be open to different possibilities." is incorrect, because it's saying that knowledge at time T-N (or the possibility of knowledge) make the event at time T necessary, which is logically unsound."

Wow! The amazing Andy Bates has just refuted work on logic that thousands upon thousands of philosophers have accepted for who knows how many years. I am so impressed! He knows more about this than all of the experts on this topic combined - than all the professional philosophers who have written peer-reviewed articles and books published by academic publishers. He certainly knows a lot more about this than the folks at the SEP, who had a recognized expert write an article on this, yet missed this simple refutation!

Again: wow!

(Plus he's now probably gonna accuse me of the fallacy of appealing to authority!)

Andy, you should write on this and submit it to a philosophical journal. I'd love to be there when you get your rejection letter. But what do THEY know?

"So if God knows that I will do X at time T, how can I have multiple possibilities at time T? Simple! Like this:

Possible World 1: God knows I will do X at time T; I do X and time T.
Possible World 2: God knows I will do Y at time T; I do Y and time T."

I've already explained (during our first discussion) why this is not only wrong, but OBVIOUSLY wrong. And yes, you completely ignored it. Both then and now.

Andy Bates

11/21/2017 01:53:07 am

“Wow! The amazing Andy Bates has just refuted work on logic that thousands upon thousands of philosophers have accepted for who knows how many years. I am so impressed!”

And thousands upon thousands of philosophers would also agree that what I’m saying is true. So? Philosophers have been debating these topics for millennia, and will continue to do so. Because see, some people actually choose to debate things, instead of just sarcastically saying, “Oh so all those other people in history are wrong?!?”

“He knows more about this than all of the experts on this topic combined - than all the professional philosophers who have written peer-reviewed articles and books published by academic publishers. He certainly knows a lot more about this than the folks at the SEP, who had a recognized expert write an article on this, yet missed this simple refutation!

Again: wow!”

All this sarcasm, just to distract from the fact that you’re unwilling to actually defend your points of make an argument. At least I’m taking a stand and defending what I believe to be true; all you have is “Wow!” and “Oh a bunch of other smart people disagree with you!” and “Oh I already responded to that before, I guess you must have missed it!”

“(Plus he's now probably gonna accuse me of the fallacy of appealing to authority!)”

Yes, because that’s what happens when you appeal to authority instead of actually presenting an argument.

“Andy, you should write on this and submit it to a philosophical journal. I'd love to be there when you get your rejection letter. But what do THEY know?”

In other words: “I’m sure a philsophical journal would totally be able to disprove your arguments (but I’m unwilling to)!”

“I've already explained (during our first discussion) why this is not only wrong, but OBVIOUSLY wrong: why this only works as a refutation of a different argument than the one I make - and moreover, of an argument that I myself refuted on that very first blog post you replied to.”

Our first discussion. That you conveniently deleted. As I said before, you lost any moral high ground to say “Why are you ignoring what I already posted” when you deleted those posts!

“And yes, you completely ignored all of that. Both then and now.”

Any excuse to avoid actually responding to my questions and arguments.

“Other philosophers would totally disagree with you!”: CHECK
“I’m not going to bother responding because you’re just going to ignore me”: CHECK
“I already answered that (in a thread that I deleted)”: CHECK
Actually using logic to respond to my argument: FAIL

Nice try though. The sarcasm and righteous indignation are great distractions, really.

But please, go on believing that anything can lock you into “one possible future.” Or maybe someday you can figure out what the word “possible” actually means.

Franz Kiekeben

11/21/2017 08:29:46 am

"And thousands upon thousands of philosophers would also agree that what I’m saying is true."

As far as I can tell, zero philosophers agree with your REASONS for denying the argument from infallible foreknowledge. Many philosophers dispute the argument on other grounds. This does not make your reasons correct. Even if those philosophers were right, merely agreeing with their conclusion does not make the reasons you offer correct. If you can't understand this, too bad.

As I've already explained, I don't debate with individuals who are only playing games. You are not so stupid that you cannot understand some of the more obvious points I've made, yet you continuously reply to these points, either as if I had not said them at all, or else by raising complaints that have nothing to do with them.That is why I claim you are just playing games.

As I've already pointed out, I'm perfectly willing to debate issues with any one who is actually willing to debate rationally - and I do so all the time. So stop with your slanders, or I'll once again begin deleting comments like your latest one. I will not put up with harassment on my own website.

Andy Bates

11/21/2017 09:39:23 am

“As far as I can tell, zero philosophers agree with your REASONS for denying the argument from infallible foreknowledge.”

Then you obviously don’t understand the argument I’m presenting. Hint: The Modal Fallacy is not something I just made up. The Frankfurtian solution is not something I came up with off the top of my head.

“As I've already explained, I don't debate with individuals who are only playing games. You are not so stupid that you cannot understand some of the more obvious points I've made, yet you continuously reply to these points, either as if I had not said them at all, or else by raising complaints that have nothing to do with them.That is why I claim you are just playing games.”

I dispute your points because I disagree with them. But if I don’t respond to your points with, “Oh that’s a great point! I concede to you.” then you throw up your hand and claim I’m “playing games” and refuse to debate further. Convenient.

“As I've already pointed out, I'm perfectly willing to debate issues with any one who is actually willing to debate rationally - and I do so all the time.”

Yeah, I’ve read the blog comments. You’re perfectly willing to respond to people who say, “Hey I really like your book!” or who agree with your posts.

“So stop with your slanders, or I'll once again begin deleting comments like your latest one. I will not put up with harassment on my own website.”

Slander is spoken. In print it’s libel.

After your little rant (“Wow! The amazing Andy Bates has just refuted thousands of philosophers! I am so impressed!”), I’m surprised you have the guts to accuse ME of harassment! I haven’t said a single thing as sarcastic or insulting as that little gem.

And of course you’re going to delete my comments. I would expect nothing less from you.

Franz Kiekeben

11/21/2017 09:56:26 am

For anyone else who might be reading this (though I doubt anyone is), here’s a simple explanation why Bates’s attempted refutation of theological determinism is invalid.

The problem of theological determinism is, basically, how can one be free to choose what to do in the future if God already infallibly knows what one is going to do in the future? For instance, if God knows right now that you are going to wear a blue shirt tomorrow, then how can you be free to choose what to wear tomorrow? It is important to keep in mind that if God already has a belief right now about the future, then that belief already is some specific belief. So, for instance, if God believes that you are going to wear a blue shirt tomorrow, then he already has the specific belief “you are going to wear a blue shirt tomorrow.”

Now, to be free (in the standard libertarian sense) at time T is to be able either to do x or refrain from doing x at T. To put it another way, unless you can actually do EITHER ONE of those things at T, then you are not free at T.

Now, suppose God infallibly knows at T1 that you are going to do x at T2. Since God has the infallible belief at T1, “you are going to do x at T2”, and since an infallible belief is one that cannot possibly be wrong, it is impossible for God’s belief at T1 that you are going to do x at T2 to be wrong. And if it is impossible for “you are going to do x at T2” to be wrong, then it is impossible GIVEN THAT GOD HAS THIS BELIEF for you to not do x at T2. To put it another way, it is inconsistent to claim BOTH that God has the infallible belief at T1 “you are going to do x at T2” and that you refrain from doing x at T2. It follows that you are not free at T2.

One can also put this in terms of possible worlds. In order for you to be free at T2, there must be a possible world in which you do x at T2 and a possible world in which you refrain from doing x at T2. So far, no problem. However, in order for you to be free at T2 GIVEN THAT God has an infallible belief at T1 that “you are going to do x at T2,” then there must be:

a possible world (1) in which God has an infallible belief at T1 that “you are going to do x at T2” and you do x at T2,

AND

a possible world (2) in which God has an infallible belief at T1 that “you are going to do x at T2” and you refrain from doing x at T2.

But there is no possible world (2). As already stated, it is inconsistent to claim both that God has the belief that you will do x and that you don’t do x.

Now, Bates attempts to refute this as follows:

“if God knows that I will do X at time T, how can I have multiple possibilities at time T? Simple! Like this:

“Possible World 1: God knows I will do X at time T; I do X and time T.
Possible World 2: God knows I will do Y at time T; I do Y and time T.
…”

In other words, he avoids possible world (2) by CHANGING what God infallibly knows at T1! He claims that in order for you to refrain from doing x at T2, God must have a DIFFERENT infallible belief at T1!

This, however, doesn’t even so much as address the actual argument. The problem, remember, is “How can we be free if God ALREADY HAS infallible knowledge now of what we are going to do in the future?” To claim that God already has infallible knowledge now is to claim that God already believes some specific thing right now. He already believes (say) that you’re going to wear a blue shirt tomorrow. And if so, then how can you be free to wear a green one instead?

Bates reply is essentially that you are free to wear a green one tomorrow EVEN IF GOD ALREADY BELIEVES YOU WILL WEAR A BLUE ONE, because IN THAT CASE God actually believes you are going to wear a green one! If that doesn’t make sense to you, that’s because (unlike Bates) you actually understand this problem.

There’s a good chance Bates will reply to this. I will respond to him if his reply actually makes sense (even though that means risking yet another pointless argument). But more likely than not, any reply from him will not make sense. He’ll probably once again claim that the above commits a simple modal error, even though I’ve already explained to him ad nauseum why it doesn’t (explanations that he ignored and/or raised nonsensical objections to). If so, I won’t bother with it. And he'll probably declare victory as a result.

I think anyone else reading this will know better.

Andy Bates

11/22/2017 01:38:36 am

“For anyone else who might be reading this (though I doubt anyone is), here’s a simple explanation why Bates’s attempted refutation of theological determinism is invalid.”

If you would actually put your explanation into logical terms (as I keep asking you to do), then it would be easier for you to recognize the errors in logic that you keep making. But since you choose to make your statements in plain English, which is not well-suited to explaining logical concepts, then you are going to continue to make the same errors.

“The problem of theological determinism is, basically, how can one be free to choose what to do in the future if God already infallibly knows what one is going to do in the future? For instance, if God knows right now that you are going to wear a blue shirt tomorrow, then how can you be free to choose what to wear tomorrow?”

Because God only knows things that are true, by the definition of omniscience. And the truth of “you are going to wear a blue shirt tomorrow” comes from your decision tomorrow about what to wear. You can not have a circular line of causation. You can not have X that is caused by Y, and Y that is caused by X. And since we already know that “I will wear a blue shirt tomorrow” causes “God knows I will wear a blue shirt tomorrow”, it can not also be the case that “God knows I will wear a blue shirt tomorrow” causes “I will wear a blue shirt tomorrow” to be true.

“Now, to be free (in the standard libertarian sense) at time T is to be able either to do x or refrain from doing x at T. To put it another way, unless you can actually do EITHER ONE of those things at T, then you are not free at T.”

Yes, that is absolutely correct. And if you demonstrate this through possible worlds, then I am free at time T if there is a possible world where I do X at time T, and a possible world where I do (not X) at time T.

“Now, suppose God infallibly knows at T1 that you are going to do x at T2.”

So you’re limiting the set of possible worlds to the ones where you are going to do X at T2, since by the definition of omniscience, God only knows things that are true.

“Since God has the infallible belief at T1, “you are going to do x at T2”, and since an infallible belief is one that cannot possibly be wrong, it is impossible for God’s belief at T1 that you are going to do x at T2 to be wrong.”

That’s correct. Again, it is difficult to spell out joint necessity in English, but you’re essentially saying that it is impossible for (God believes you will do X at T2 AND you do not do X at T2). Those two propositions are jointly impossible.

“And if it is impossible for “you are going to do x at T2” to be wrong, then it is impossible GIVEN THAT GOD HAS THIS BELIEF for you to not do x at T2.”

NO! It is impossible for those two propositions to JOINTLY be true, but that does not mean that the truth of ONE means that it is impossible for the SECOND one to be true. You are committing the Modal Fallacy again.

Let me see if I can explain it differently: Take two propositions, “I have two children” and “I have no children”. Now, it is logically impossible that (“I have two children” AND “I have no children”) are both true. If someone has two children, then by definition, they do not have no children. There is no possible world where both of those statements are true.

So now, let’s take a world where I have two children. You could say, “It’s impossible that (I have two children AND I have no children) are jointly true. And since I have two children, then it must be impossible that I have no children.” But that logic would be incorrect. It’s not impossible for me to have no children! There are plenty of possible worlds where I have no children! If (A AND B) are jointly impossible, then it is incorrect to say that “A is true” implies that “B is impossible.” The truth of A can’t change (not B) from being a CONTINGENT proposition to being a NECSSARY proposition. That is, again, the Modal Fallacy.

“To put it another way, it is inconsistent to claim BOTH that God has the infallible belief at T1 “you are going to do x at T2” and that you refrain from doing x at T2.”

That is correct. You can’t JOINTLY claim that both of these things are true. They are JOINTLY impossible.

“It follows that you are not free at T2.”

NO. As long as there are possible worlds where I make a different choice at T2, I remain free at T2. You can not confer the necessity of the CONSEQUENCE to the necessity of the CONSEQUENT.

(I’ll comment on the rest later, since I don’t want my response to get cut off.)

Andy Bates

11/22/2017 01:45:25 am

Really, your argument is just Aristotle’s Sea Battle rephrased.

“Let's suppose there is a sea battle tomorrow between A and B. It must be true that either A wins or B wins. Therefore, it is necessarily true that (A wins OR B wins). So if A wins the battle tomorrow, then it cannot be true that B wins. And if it is necessary that (A wins or B wins), and it cannot be true that B wins, then is must be necessarily true that A wins. Therefore, whatever is true is NECESSARILY true.”

(And by the way, the logic that “If A is true, then A is NECESSARILY true” is wrong, because it commits the same Modal Fallacy.)

Franz Kiekeben

11/21/2017 10:05:25 am

"The Modal Fallacy is not something I just made up. The Frankfurtian solution is not something I came up with off the top of my head."

The modal fallacy has nothing to do with this argument, and the "solution" you are presenting has nothing to do with the Frankfurtian solution.

I actually agree that the Frankfurtian solution is reasonable. It's the only one that I think one can make that maintains both that God has infallible foreknowledge and that we have libertarian free will. However, I can also see how a libertarian might be dissatisfied with its claim to capture what is essential to free will. (This is why I now say "libertarian free will in the STANDARD sense" when referring to the incompatibility between free will and God's foreknowledge).

"Slander is spoken. In print it’s libel."

In the narrower sense, yes. But there is a wider sense in which that is not the case, at least if I can trust the Unabridged Random House Dictionary, which defines slander as "a malicious, false, and defamatory statement or report..." before going on to another definition that specifically includes "by oral utterance".

Andy Bates

11/21/2017 10:51:42 am

“The modal fallacy has nothing to do with this argument”

Your statement: “God’s foreknowledge implies that there is only one possible future: the only events that can happen are the ones God knows will occur.”

Let’s put it in logical terms:

gK(X): “God infallibly knows X”
(X): “X” (or “X is true”)
NECESSARY(X): “X is necessarily true”

Now let’s translate your statement into logical terms:

1. NECESSARY(gK(X)->(X)) [Definition of foreknowledge]
2. gK(X) [Assumption: “God’s foreknowledge [of a specific event]”]
3. Therefore NECESSARY(X) [From 1 and 2: “…implies that there is only one possible future: the only events that can happen [X] are the ones that God knows will occur [gK(X)].”]

From the Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy:

“But this third premise, we have seen above, is false; it commits the modal fallacy.
…
Once the logical error is detected, and removed, the argument for epistemic determinism simply collapses. If some future action/choice is known prior to its occurrence, that event does not thereby become "necessary", "compelled", "forced", or what have you. Inasmuch as its description was, is, and will remain forever contingent, both it and its negation remain possible. Of course only one of the two was, is, and will remain true; while the other was, is, and will remain false. But truth and falsity, per se, do not determine a proposition's modality. Whether true or false, each of these propositions was, is, and will remain possible. Knowing – whether by God or a human being – some future event no more forces that event to occur than our learning that dinosaurs lived in (what is now) South Dakota forced those reptiles to take up residence there.”

The Modal Fallacy is in assigning necessity of the consequence [NECESSARY(gK(X)->(X))] to necessity of the [gK(X)->NECESSARY(X)]. But if you remove the Modal Fallacy, then the logic becomes:

1. NECESSARY(gK(X)->(X)) [Definition of foreknowledge]
2. gK(X) [Assumption: “God’s foreknowledge [of a specific event]”]
3. Therefore (X) [From 1 and 2, with the Modal Fallacy removed]

Or translated back into English: “God’s foreknowledge implies that there is only one ACTUAL future: the only events that WILL happen are the ones that God knows will occur. However, all other events remain POSSIBLE, and free will is maintained.”

In other words, yes, your argument absolutely commits the Modal Fallacy.

Franz Kiekeben

11/21/2017 11:39:11 am

And as I've already explained, the IEP article is talking about a different argument (what one might call the simple foreknowledge argument, rather than the argument from infallible foreknowledge).

And as I've already explained before, your statement of my argument is incorrect. Premise one is not

NECESSARY(gK(X)->(X))

but

gK(X)-> NECESSARY(X)

And as I've already pointed out before (and anyone here can just look this up), I even discussed the above simple foreknowledge argument, and POINTED OUT WHY IT IS FLAWED, on the original blog post you responded to back in 2015.

All these things have been previously pointed out to you, more than once. And you never responded to them, or acknowledged them. You just keep repeating the same irrelevant objection.

Bye now.

Andy Bates

11/21/2017 12:16:21 pm

“And as I've already explained before, your statement of my argument is incorrect. Premise one is: gK(X)-> NECESSARY(X)”

So you decided to eliminate the logical progression that leads you to the Modal Fallacy, and instead just assume the Modal Fallacy at the beginning! I guess that’s more efficient.

See, this is what I talk about when I say you’re assuming your conclusion.

Franz Kiekeben

11/22/2017 10:09:13 am

I wasn't gonna bother with this one, but since I just replied to another one of your comments:

"So you decided to eliminate the logical progression that leads you to the Modal Fallacy, and instead just assume the Modal Fallacy at the beginning! ... See, this is what I talk about when I say you’re assuming your conclusion."

I guess that according to your "alternative facts" reality, the fact that I've provided an argument FOR the claim in question means I'm just assuming the claim in question!

Andy Bates

11/22/2017 11:31:33 am

“I guess that according to your "alternative facts" reality, the fact that I've provided an argument FOR the claim in question means I'm just assuming the claim in question!”

What is your logical proof, using logical notation, for the claim in question?? You continue to be unable to provide that!

I was attempting to your arguments and translate them into logical notation, and you responded with, “And as I've already explained before, your statement of my argument is incorrect. Premise one is: gK(X)-> NECESSARY(X)” But that’s not the premise; that’s the conclusion! And as I already showed (using logical notation), your argument to get to that conclusion contains the same logical fallacy.

Franz Kiekeben

11/22/2017 09:59:50 am

Being the eternal optimist I am, I can't resist giving it one more shot, even though I'm not so optimistic that I actually think I'll get through to you. But again, if anyone else is reading this, the following may be useful.

You said:

“since we already know that “I will wear a blue shirt tomorrow” causes “God knows I will wear a blue shirt tomorrow”, it can not also be the case that “God knows I will wear a blue shirt tomorrow” causes “I will wear a blue shirt tomorrow” to be true.”

And when did I or anyone else claim that God’s knowledge causes what you will wear? The kind of theological determinism under discussion here, as I’ve already explained and as I’m sure you know, is not a type of causal determinism. So this is just irrelevant.

“I am free at time T if there is a possible world where I do X at time T, and a possible world where I do (not X) at time T.”

Wrong! And again, we’ve been through this before. You are not free if determinism is true. But determinism being true doesn’t mean it is logically impossible for something else to happen; it only means that it is impossible for something else to happen GIVEN THAT certain things are the case. (I pointed this out two years ago, and you weaseled your way out of it by claiming that I was changing the subject.)

If you were correct, you would have just demonstrated that free will is logically necessary. Unless that’s what you’re actually claiming, you should admit the above is incorrect. But I think that if there is a God, he already infallibly knows you’re not going to do that.

“So you’re limiting the set of possible worlds to the ones where you are going to do X at T2, since by the definition of omniscience, God only knows things that are true.”

By the definition of KNOWLEDGE, all of US only know things that are true! But yes, in this case, the argument (like all arguments for any type of determinism) is limiting the set of possibilities to those that are consistent with the existence of the fact make things determined. That’s the entire point! Here, the fact that determines your future acts is not knowledge per se (as I’ve already explained in the blog post from 2015, and especially in the addendum – and as the IEP article you keep referencing also shows) but belief – more specifically, infallible belief. (And the latter is what the IEP article doesn’t address, by the way.)

To my claim: “And if it is impossible for “you are going to do x at T2” to be wrong, then it is impossible GIVEN THAT GOD HAS THIS BELIEF for you to not do x at T2.”

You replied:

“NO! It is impossible for those two propositions to JOINTLY be true, but that does not mean that the truth of ONE means that it is impossible for the SECOND one to be true. You are committing the Modal Fallacy again.”

For the umpteenth time, you're missing the point! As I keep telling you, and you keep ignoring – or maybe in this case actually not understanding – we’re not talking about logical necessity here. Your objection would only work if the claim were about logical necessity. You are entirely correct that the truth of one does not make the other logically impossible! The fact that I agree with this, and have never disagreed with it, is the reason why I am not making the modal error you keep mentioning – as I’ve already explained many times! However, the truth of one makes the other actually impossible – impossible given the way things are. That is the whole point behind any argument for determinism.

Moreover, this is exactly the same confusion that led you above (apparently unintentionally) to imply that free will is logically necessary. You’re just (again, apparently without realizing it) denying the very coherence of determinism – any kind of determinism – by claiming that, no matter what might be the case, it is LOGICALLY possible for x to either happen or not happen at some future time T. But that is to completely misunderstand determinism, which is not about logical necessity at all.

Andy Bates

11/22/2017 05:18:27 pm

“And when did I or anyone else claim that God’s knowledge causes what you will wear? The kind of theological determinism under discussion here, as I’ve already explained and as I’m sure you know, is not a type of causal determinism. So this is just irrelevant.”

If you’re making an argument in the form of “If X, then Necessarily(Y)”, then you’re talking about causation. And yes, epistemic determinism is a form of causal determinism, where the cause is God’s knowledge.

Every event has to have a cause. And is I’ve already shown, by the definition of omniscience, the truth of “I will wear a blue shirt at time T” causes “God knows I will wear a blue shirt at time T” to be true. And since X causes (God knows X), the converse can’t be true.

“Wrong! And again, we’ve been through this before. You are not free if determinism is true. But determinism being true doesn’t mean it is logically impossible for something else to happen; it only means that it is impossible for something else to happen GIVEN THAT certain things are the case.”

And as we talked about before, the “certain preconditions” do not include future contingents, which are statements whose truth condition is dependent on events in the future (which is why logical determinism is incorrect). And God’s knowledge is a future contingent, by the definition of omniscience, since it is based on events happening in the future. Therefore, it’s not a valid precondition that you can use to prove determinism.

“(I pointed this out two years ago, and you weaseled your way out of it by claiming that I was changing the subject.)”

You know what? You gave up your right to claim what I did two years ago when you deleted those comments. Please do not continue to claim what I did or didn’t argue back then. If you want to know what I believe, just ask me.

“If you were correct, you would have just demonstrated that free will is logically necessary.”

Disproving an argument for determinism does not lead to the conclusion that free will is logically necessary. It just means that that specific argument for determinism is false.

“By the definition of KNOWLEDGE, all of US only know things that are true!”

Yes, which is why your argument that omniscience causes determinism falls apart, because simple knowledge does not also cause determinism. Just like “Joe knows you will wear a blue shirt tomorrow” is contingent on the truth of “You will wear a blue shirt tomorrow”, the statement “God knows you will wear a blue shirt tomorrow” is contingent on “You will wear a blue shirt tomorrow”, by definition.

“But yes, in this case, the argument (like all arguments for any type of determinism) is limiting the set of possibilities to those that are consistent with the existence of the fact make things determined.”

You previously said: “And when did I or anyone else claim that God’s knowledge causes what you will wear?” And the answer is, right here: “…the existence of the fact make things determined.” If a fact MAKES something determined, then it CAUSES that thing.

“Here, the fact that determines your future acts is not knowledge per se (as I’ve already explained in the blog post from 2015, and especially in the addendum – and as the IEP article you keep referencing also shows) but belief – more specifically, infallible belief.”

Knowledge is justified true belief. Infallible belief is a subset of justified true belief. So yes, infallible belief is a form of knowledge.

“For the umpteenth time, you're missing the point! As I keep telling you, and you keep ignoring – or maybe in this case actually not understanding – we’re not talking about logical necessity here. Your objection would only work if the claim were about logical necessity.”

Even if you’re talking about epistemic determinism, your argument still needs to follow simple logic! The term “logical determinism” means that the argument is based on the concept of logic, not that it’s the only form of argument that uses logic. You can’t just say “I’m not talking about logical determinism!” and ignore any criticisms about your logic.

“However, the truth of one makes the other actually impossible – impossible given the way things are. That is the whole point behind any argument for determinism.”

But “given the way things are” does not apply to future contingents, as you said in the other (now deleted) discussion. So you’re limiting the scope of possible worlds to the worlds where “I will do X at time T” is true. And of course it is impossible for (I will do X at time T AND I will do Not-X at time T) t

Franz Kiekeben

11/22/2017 06:10:46 pm

You've once again demonstrated that my hopes of actually getting through to you were entirely illusory. Oh well, I can't say I'm surprised.

And by the way, "determined" does not mean "caused." At least learn a little about a topic before spending weeks discussing it - and especially before acting like you're the number one expert in the world on it.

Now go bother someone else. I've already refuted what you said, and absolutely NOTHING of the gibberish you replied with even begins to address any of my points.

Andy Bates

11/22/2017 06:56:04 pm

“You've once again demonstrated that my hopes of actually getting through to you were entirely illusory. Oh well, I can't say I'm surprised.”

And you’ve once again demonstrated that you are unable to structure your claims as a logical proof, which means that you come to false conclusions based on how poor English is as a way to express logical expressions.

“And by the way, "determined" does not mean "caused."”

“de·ter·min·ism (noun) (PHILOSOPHY): the doctrine that all events, including human action, are ultimately determined by CAUSES external to the will.”

If something is determined, then it is CAUSED by something external to the will. That is the specific definition!

“At least learn a little about a topic before spending weeks discussing it - and especially before acting like you're the number one expert in the world on it.”

It doesn’t take a “number one expert in the world” to refute your arguments. Not even close.

“Now go bother someone else. I've already refuted what you said, and absolutely NOTHING of the gibberish you replied with even begins to address any of my points.”

Until you are able to put your claims into the form of a logical proof, you haven’t refuted anything. But I’m happy to leave you alone. It must be difficult to subject your opinions to any sort of logical scrutiny.

Franz Kiekeben

11/23/2017 07:53:47 am

In philosophy, "determinism" is not used exclusively to mean "causal determinism."

I have already refuted your claims THOROUGHLY. And your idiotic demand that I put things in logical language is nothing but another game you're playing: putting something into logical symbols doesn't change the meaning of what I'm saying, and the one time I did you - exactly as I expected - simply denied what I said.

Andy Bates

11/23/2017 09:25:23 am

Theological determinism is a form of causal determinism, where the cause is God’s knowledge. And if you’re not talking are causation, then you’re just talking about correlation. And of course there’s always going to be a correlation between “X is true” and “God knows X is true”, because the truth of something causes God’s knowledge of that thing.

And using logical notation is the accepted method of rigorously proving logical statements; it’s not a “game” or something you do once and never again. The English language is not good at specifying scope, which is why you keep making the same modal scope fallacy over and over and over again.

Franz Kiekeben

11/24/2017 07:50:58 am

"which is why you keep making the same modal scope fallacy over and over and over again."

Andy, what you should say is:

"which is why almost every single philosopher who has considered this issue, and especially those who are regarded as experts on the topic, keep making the same modal scope fallacy over and over again."

Similarly, when you said,

"It doesn’t take a “number one expert in the world” to refute your arguments. Not even close."

You really should have said,

"It doesn’t take a “number one expert in the world” to refute the arguments of almost every philosopher who has considered this issue, and especially of those who are regarded as experts on the topic. Not even close."

ANOTHER PROBLEM WITH THE BOETHIAN SOLUTION

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